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This dissertation studies on ﬁrm competition in two industries, airline indus-
try and banking industry. Firms compete not only in price but also in non-price
strategies. The ﬁrst essay examines cost structure decision of airlines as a non-price
strategy theoretically, and the second essay examines branching decision of banks
as a non-price strategy using Korean banking data empirically.
The ﬁrst essay examines the equilibria of a duopoly game modelling airline
competition. Two ex ante identical ﬁrms choose a cost structure in the ﬁst stage
and then compete in price. I assume that airlines with undiﬀerentiated service (i.e.,
vii
only having one “economy class”) have lower costs, while airlines diﬀerentiating
their products have higher costs. There are three types of subgame perfect equilib-
ria (SPE): symmetric higher-cost SPE, symmetric lower-cost SPE, and asymmetric
SPE. Without cost advantages, entry of an airline with undiﬀerentiated service is not
proﬁtable. Examples illustrate the market conditions that induce the asymmetric
equilibrium in which the two ex ante identical airlines choose diﬀerent cost struc-
tures. I show that in asymmetric equilibria, an airline running a low-cost airplane
may have higher proﬁts than an airline running a normal airplane, except when
tourists are not price sensitive and the social beneﬁt of business class service is high.
Although both the subgame perfect equilibria and the equilibria maximizing social
welfare are aﬀected critically by the cost advantage and social beneﬁt of business
class service, they diﬀer for some parameter ranges. Not only symmetric equilibria
but also asymmetric equilibria may maximize social welfare for some parameters.
The second essay examines the eﬀect of competition between Korean com-
mercial banks with widely divergent branch network structures in the period between
1994 to 1996. It develops a discrete choice model in a competitive framework and
allows for banks to choose their deposit interest rate and branch network as well
as for depositors to choose a bank for deposit services. The estimates show that
branching competition did not change a bank’s market power. They also show that
regional banks with locally intensive branch networks had much higher markups
than did the nationwide banks. The results indicate that overlap between diﬀerent
banks’ branch networks increases competition between them and that nationwide
banks have a higher cross price elasticity of demand than regional banks. The re-
sults show that banks located their branches more in markets with higher branch
elasticities.
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Chapter 1
Cost Advantages in Firm
Competition: The Airline
Markets
1.1 Introduction
Keith McMullan, of Aviation Economics, a London consultancy, cal-
culates that the low-cost carriers are growing at more than 25% a year
(despite the crisis) compared with 4-5% (in normal times) for the Euro-
pean ﬂag carriers....Ryanair’s capitalization is now greater than British
Airways’, following the trend in America, where Southwest Airlines, orig-
inator of today’s low-cost business model, is worth more than the coun-
try’s ﬁve top mainstream carriers added together. (The Economist, 2
March 2002)
Since the deregulation of the U.S. airline industry, Southwest Airlines, one of
the low-cost carriers, has become the most successful airline in the industry. While
many major airlines make their proﬁts by serving both business class and economy
class, low-cost carriers serve only economy class. At the same time it is reported
1
that the major airlines make a substantial proportion of their proﬁts by providing
special service for business travellers1, yet low-cost carriers are still experiencing
rapid growth without providing these services.
Low-cost carriers are mainly characterized by point-to-point networks, no-
frills service, unreserved seating, lower cost structures2, and not having business class
seats. In the U.S., Southwest Airlines, established in 1971, has been proﬁtable every
year since 1973. Recently, many other low-cost carriers, Air Tran, ATA, JetBlue,
and Frontier, have also been experiencing rapid growth rates. Low-cost carriers are
thriving not only in the U.S. but also in Europe, Canada, and Australia. Ryanair
and easyJet are the two fastest-growing low-cost carriers in Europe.
The low-cost carriers’ share of US domestic passengers has increased from
7% in 1990 to 23.7% in 2002 (Ito and Lee, 2006), and the growth of the low-cost
carriers has created a competitive clash with the major carriers. In particular,
the major airline’ networks have become highly exposed to the low-cost carriers.
According to Ito and Lee (2006), the major airlines made 16.1 to 51 % of their
domestic revenue in direct competition with low-cost carriers in 2002. This paper
examines competition between low-cost carriers and major airlines in the airline
industry. In particular, it models and explains the growth of the low-cost carriers
and their market penetration. The paper focuses on three central questions:
1. Under what market conditions do low-cost carriers and major airlines compete
with each other in a city-pair market?
2. Under what conditions are low-cost carriers more proﬁtable than major airlines
in the market?
1“As airlines rely on business travellers for roughly two-thirds of their revenues,...”(The
Economist, 16 August 2001)
2It is reported that they reduce costs by having simple networks, running one type of airplane,
reducing labor cost, providing no-frill service, and so on.
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3. What is the socially optimal industry cost structure?
Many empirical studies3 of the airline industry examine the growth of low-
cost carriers and the major airlines’ responses. Dresner et al. (1996) estimates the
impact of the entry of low-cost carriers on route-speciﬁc yields and on the yields
of competitive routings, with the former having been reduced by 38 per cent and
the latter having been reduced by 0 to 41 per cent. Morrison (2001) also estimates
passengers’ fare savings due to actual, adjacent, and potential competition from
Southwest Airlines in 1998. Morrison estimates that the full eﬀect of Southwest was
$12.9 billion in savings to passengers, which amounts to 20 per cent of the airline
industry’s 1998 domestic passenger revenue. Boguslaski et al. (2004) investigate
Southwest’s entry strategies throughout the 1990s. They ﬁnd evidence that South-
west entered into medium-haul markets (i.e. 600-1200 miles) as well as very dense
short-haul markets (i.e. less than 600 miles). Although the empirical literature
provides insights about low-cost carriers’ pricing strategies, their entry patterns and
consumer welfare, there exists no theoretical literature, to my knowledge, predicting
the airlines’ equilibrium entry and pricing strategies and evaluating them from the
social welfare perspective. In particular, the purposes of this paper are to exam-
ine the existence of an asymmetric equilibrium as well as symmetric equilibria4, to
identify the market conditions that give rise to those diﬀerent equilibria, and ﬁnally
to identify socially optimal cost structure equilibria.
While much previous literature5 has focused on the ﬁrm’s optimality of pro-
3e.g., Ito and Lee (2006), Morrison (2001), Dresner et al. (1996), Boguslaski et al. (2004), and
so on.
4It is known that airplanes with diﬀerentiated seat classes, like those run by the ‘major airlines’,
cost more to run than airplanes with undiﬀerentiated seat class, like those run by ‘low-cost carriers’.
There may exist an equilibrium in which ex ante identical airlines choose diﬀerent cost structures
in a city-pair market. That is, one will choose to diﬀerentiate seats and the other will not. I call
it as an “asymmetric equilibrium”. Likewise, there may exist two types of “symmetric equilibria”
in which ex ante identical airlines choose the same diﬀerentiated seats cost structure or the same
undiﬀerentiated seats cost structure.
5Katz (1984) examines competition among multi-product ﬁrms with ﬁrm-speciﬁc diﬀerentia-
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viding vertically diﬀerentiated products in an oligopoly with a symmetric cost struc-
ture, in the airline industry, whether or not to oﬀer diﬀerentiated service is a crucial
strategic choice. There are cost savings due to specialization in economy class, such
as is done by the low-cost carriers. This paper examines the role of this diﬀerent
cost structure on the airline’s optimality of providing vertically diﬀerentiated ser-
vices (i.e. the coexistence of low-cost carriers having undiﬀerentiated service with
the major airlines having diﬀerentiated services) and the proﬁtability of low-cost
carriers in the airline industry.
This paper models two ex ante identical airlines’ choice of airplanes with
diﬀerent cost structures and price competition in a two-stage duopoly game. Thus,
it endogenizes the airlines’ multi-product decisions by assuming that the airlines can
choose whether or not to diﬀerentiate their seats in the ﬁrst stage. I ﬁnd that there
exist three types of subgame perfect equilibria, the type of which varies according
to the parameters. In asymmetric equilibria, an airline running a low-cost airplane
may have higher proﬁts than an airline running a normal airplane except when
tourists are not price sensitive and the social beneﬁt of business class service is high.
Not only symmetric equilibria but also asymmetric equilibria may maximize social
welfare for some parameters.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, the basic assumptions and model
are introduced. Section 3 presents the airlines’ equilibrium prices in the second
tion. Assuming symmetric cost structures, he shows that multi-product ﬁrms have an incentive to
compete less ﬁercely for products with lower quality due to a self-selection constraint maintaining
high price of the products with high quality. Gilbert and Matutes (1993) and Verboven (1999) also
provide a theoretical analysis of brand competition with multiple qualities. Gilbert and Matutes
(1993) assume that heterogeneous consumers are continuously distributed not only between two
brand ﬁrms but also between two diﬀerent qualities. They show that competitive price discrimina-
tion forces both ﬁrms to markup diﬀerent quality goods to the same level under the assumption of
continuous distribution of heterogeneity. On the other hand, Verboven (1999) shows that premium
products have larger percentage markups than base products in the brand rivalry model with lim-
ited consumer information. Other references for competition of multi-product ﬁrms are Armstrong
and Vickers (2001), Corts (1998), Holmes (1989), and Johnson and Myatt (2003).
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stage game. Section 4 presents the SPE and their properties through examples, and
compares some of the second stage equilibrium proﬁts. Section 5 ﬁnds the socially
optimal mix of cost structures. The ﬁnal section concludes.
1.2 The model
I set a two-stage duopoly model. I assume that two ex ante identical airlines, A
and B, run their own ﬂights between a pair of cities one time per one day and each
operates only one airplane. In the ﬁrst stage, airlines A and B, choose either a
“normal” airplane, that is, one with diﬀerentiated seats, or a “low-cost” airplane,
that is, one with only economy class seats. In the second stage, the airlines compete
in Bertrand fashion. A normal airplane is assumed to have the marginal costs of
serving economy class, c , and of serving business class, c+ cH . A low-cost airplane
is assumed to have the marginal cost, cE , where cE < c < c + cH .
Airlines A and B are assumed to operate their ﬂights at diﬀerent times; for
instance, airline A’s ﬂight departs at 8:00 am and airline B’s ﬂight departs at 10:00
am. I assume that consumers’ preferences over the departure times are uniformly
distributed between 8:00 am and 10:00 am. Airline A with an 8:00 am ﬂight is
located at dAand the airline B with a 10:00 am ﬂight is located at dB, each of which
is assumed to be at the extreme point of a linear city following the Hotelling model.
I assume that two types of consumers, say, business travellers and tourists,
are characterized by the following parameters: their location, f , their opportunity
cost of saving time, zθ (zb for business travellers, zt for tourists), and their additional
willingness to pay for business class, Vθ (Vb for business travellers, Vt for tourists)6.
f is uniformly distributed over [dA, dB]. I assume there exist N consumers. Business
6zθ denotes the degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation and Vθ denotes the degree of vertical diﬀer-
entiation. The two types of consumers are deﬁned by their sensitivities to these two diﬀerentiated
services
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travellers (θ = b) occur with the probability, β1+β , and tourists (θ = t) occur with the
probability, 11+β . Business travellers are assumed to have much higher costs than
tourists, zb > zt, for unit deviation of dA (or dB) from their locations. Assuming
that airlines A and B are located at dA = 0 and dB = 1, a type (θ, f) of consumer
has a utility function U(p : θ, f) = w+Vθ−zθ|f−di|−pibu if he or she buys an airline
i’s business class service at pibu and U(p : θ, f) = w−zθ|f−di|−piec if he or she buys
an airline i’s economy class service at piec, where p
i
bu and p
i
ec are the prices of the
airline i’s business and economy classes respectively and pbu = (pibu, p
−i
bu ), pec = (p
i
ec,
p−iec ). The reservation price, w, is assumed to be so large that all travellers will
purchase an airline’s service in equilibrium.
Assumption 1 Vb > cH > Vt.
Assumption 1 implies that the business traveller’s utility increase for an
upgrade to business class service from economy class service is greater than the
airline’s cost increase. In contrast, the tourist’s utility increase for the upgraded
service is less than the airline’s cost increase.
An airline’s choice of a normal airplane in the ﬁrst stage will be denoted
by “B/E”, for “Business and Economy”, and an airline’s choice of a low-cost air-
plane will be denoted by “E”, for “Economy”. Given s ∈ S, an airline’s strategy
in the ﬁrst stage, where S = {(B/E,B/E), (E,E), (E,B/E), (B/E,E)}, the equi-
librium prices, (pi∗(s), pj∗(s)) are argmax πi(pi(s), pj(s)), where (pi∗(s), pj∗(s)) =
{(pi∗bu(s), pi∗ec(s)), (pj∗bu(s), pj∗ec(s))}, i = A,B and i = j, .
The subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) may exist as follows: there may exist
a symmetric SPE,
{
(B/E,B/E) , (pA∗(1), pB∗(1)); (πA∗B/E(1), π
B∗
B/E(1))
}
– Case 1 in
which both airlines provide both business class and economy class seats (B/E,B/E),
there may exist a symmetric SPE,
{
(E,E) ,
(
pA∗(2), pB∗(2)
)
; (πA∗E (2), π
B∗
E (2))
}
–
Case 2 in which both airlines provide only economy class seats (E,E), and there
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may exist an asymmetric SPE,
{
(E,B/E) , (pA∗(3), pB∗(3)); (πA∗E (3), π
B∗
B/E(3))
}
–
Case 3 in which only one airline, call it A, provides both business class and economy
class seats (B/E,E).
Airline A \ Airline B (B/E) (E)
(B/E) (πA∗B/E(1), π
B∗
B/E(1)) (π
A∗
B/E(3), π
B∗
E (3))
(E) (πA∗E (3), π
B∗
B/E(3)) (π
A∗
E (2), π
B∗
E (2))
Table 1.1: A Reduced Normal Form Game
The reduced normal form game in Table 1 illustrates the airlines’ payoﬀs in
the ﬁrst stage based on the equilibrium proﬁts in the second stage. Each airline
chooses its strategy in the ﬁrst stage, based on the payoﬀs in the reduced normal
form game. A SPE with Case 1 in the second stage would exist if πi∗B/E(1) ≥ πi∗E (3),
i = A,B. A SPE with Case 2 in the second stage would exist if πi∗E (2) ≥ πi∗B/E(3),
i = A,B. A SPE with Case 3 in the second stage would exist if πi∗B/E(3) ≥ πi∗E (2)
and πj∗E (3) ≥ πj∗B/E(1), i = A,B and j = i.
1.3 The second stage equilibrium
In this section I derive the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium for each case determined by
airlines’ choices of airplanes in the ﬁrst stage. The airlines would be faced with
one of the following three scenarios: Case 1 in which each airline chooses a normal
airplane; Case 2 in which each airline chooses a low-cost airplane; and Case 3 in
which airline A chooses a normal airplane and airline B chooses a low-cost airplane.
Lemma 1 Let Assumption 1 hold. If an airline, say i = A,B, chooses a normal
airplane, then pibu− piec = Vb dominates pibu− piec > Vb and pibu− piec = Vt dominates
pibu − piec < Vt. Therefore, Vb  pibu − piec  Vt is the range of the undominated
prices.
7
Note that it is optimal for two diﬀerent type of consumers to buy diﬀerent
services in this range of undominated prices. Thus, Assumption 1 eliminates the
equilibria in which an airline providing both classes of service sets its prices such
that both types of consumers choose the same class of service7.
1.3.1 Case 1: Both airlines chooses normal airplanes.
Here, I examine the Hotelling price competition between airlines serving both busi-
ness class and economy class. A consumer with (θ, f) maximizes her utility by
purchasing an airline’s service that solves maxi,k(w + Vθ − zθ|f − di| − pik), where
i = A,B, given the set of prices, {(pAbu, pAec), (pBbu, pBec)}.
Demand for each airline’s services can be derived from both types of con-
sumers’ utility maximization problems. Let fˆb be the business traveller who is
indiﬀerent between airlines A and B, that is, such that w + Vb − zbfˆb − pA1bu =
w + Vb − zb(1 − fˆb) − pB1bu. Then, fˆb =
(
zb+p
B
1bu−pA1bu
2zb
)
, and the business travellers
located in [0, fˆb] prefer buying airline A’s business class service to airline B’s busi-
ness class service, and airline B’s is preferred to airline A’s for business travellers
in [fˆb, 1]. Tourists located in [0, fˆt], fˆt =
(
zt+pB1ec−pA1ec
2zt
)
, have a higher utility for
airline A’s economy class service than airline B’s economy class service, and airline
B provides higher utility to tourists in [fˆt, 1] than airline A.
Lemma 2 Suppose that all airlines serve both classes. If Assumption 1 holds and
zb − zt > Vb − cH , then pi∗bu = pi∗ec + Vb, i = A,B in equilibria.
Lemma 2 implies that when business travellers are price insensitive relative to
tourists, the airline serving both classes might have a binding self-selection constraint
in setting prices for both classes.
7There might exist cases in which it is optimal for an airline to separate two types of consumers
even if Assumption 1 does not hold, Vt > cH . However, I focus on the cases in which Assumption
1 holds.
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As shown in Theorem 1, in the absence of a binding self-selection constraint,
equilibrium prices are determined only by costs and horizontal diﬀerentiation. With
a binding self-selection constraint, each equilibrium price is aﬀected by costs and
both horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation. In other words, there exist competition
spillovers between two classes of services.
Theorem 1 Suppose that all airlines serve both classes and Assumption 1 holds.
If zb − zt ≤ Vb − cH , then equilibrium prices are pi∗bu = c + cH + zb, pi∗ec = c + zt,
i = A,B. If Assumption 1 holds and zb − zt > Vb − cH , then equilibrium prices are
pi∗bu = c +
{(1+β)zb−β(V b−cH)}zt
zb+βzt
+ Vb, pi∗ec = c +
{(1+β)zb−β(Vb−cH)}zt
zb+βzt
, i = A,B.
Corollary 1 Suppose all airlines serve both classes and Assumption 1 holds. When
zb − zt ≤ Vb− cH , (pi∗1bu− c− cH)− (pi∗1ec− c) = zb − zt, and when zb − zt > Vb− cH ,
(pi∗1bu − c− cH)− (pi∗1ec − c) = Vb − cH , i = A,B.
Vb − cH is the social welfare increase from providing upgraded business class
service to business travellers and thus might be a maximum markup diﬀerence be-
tween business class and economy class services in equilibrium. Corollary 1 shows
that the diﬀerence between the equilibrium markups for business class and economy
class services is the lesser of zb − zt and Vb − cH . Thus, the markup diﬀerence be-
tween two classes is determined by zb − zt when competition for business travellers
and for tourists is similar (i.e. zb − zt ≤ Vb − cH), while the markup diﬀerence be-
tween two classes is determined by Vb− cH when competition for business travellers
and for tourists is very diﬀerent (i.e. zb − zt > Vb − cH).
1.3.2 Case 2: Both chooses low-cost airplanes.
I derive the price equilibrium in Case 2 in which airlines A and B compete for
both types of consumers, with only economy class service. A consumer with (
9
θ, f) chooses an airline’s economy class service such that it would make w− zθ|f −
di| − piec ≥ w − zθ|f − dj | − pjec where i, j = A,B and j = i. Then, the demand
each airline has is βN1+β (
zb+p
j
ec−piec
2zb
) from business travellers and N1+β (
zt+p
j
ec−piec
2zt
) from
tourists, where i, j = A,B and j = i.
Theorem 2 Suppose both airlines serve only economy class. The equilibrium prices
are pi∗ec = cE +
(1+β)zbzt
(zb+βzt)
, i = A,B.
When both airlines serve only economy class, the equilibrium prices depend
on the ratio of business travellers to tourists and both types of consumers’ price
sensitivity.
1.3.3 Case 3: One airline chooses a normal airplane and the other
airline chooses a low-cost airplane.
I now derive the price equilibrium in Case 3 in which airline A chooses a normal
airplane and airline B chooses a low cost airplane. A consumer with ( θ, f) choosing
an airline i’s economy class service would have consumer surplus w− zθ|f −di|−piec
where i = A,B, while the consumer choosing airline A’s business class service would
have consumer surplus w+Vθ− zθ|f − dA| − pA3bu. By Lemma 2, a business traveller
with ( θ = b, f) will choose between airline A’s business class and airline B’s economy
class in equilibrium. Let fˆb be such that w + Vb − zbfˆb − pAbu = w− zb(1− fˆb)− pBec.
Then, business travellers located in [0, fˆb], fˆb =
(
zb+Vb+p
B
ec−pAbu
2zb
)
, will have higher
utility for airline A’s business class than for airline B’s economy class and vice versa.
By Lemma 2, a tourist with (θ = t, f) will choose between the two airlines’ economy
class services in equilibrium. Let fˆt be such that w−ztfˆt−pAec = w−zt(1− fˆt)−pBec.
Then, tourists located in [0, fˆt], fˆt =
(
zt+pBec−pAec
2zt
)
, will prefer buying airline A’s
economy class to airline B’s economy class and vice versa.
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Theorem 3 Suppose that airline A provides both classes of service and that airline
B provides only economy class service, and Assumption 1 holds.
If zb − zt ≤ Vb − cH , then airlines’ equilibrium prices are
pA∗bu = c−
c− cE
3
+
cH+Vb
2
+
1
2
(zb +
(1 + β)zbzt
(zb + βzt)
)− β(Vb − cH)zt
6(zb + βzt)
,
pA∗ec = c−
c− cE
3
+
1
2
(zt +
(1 + β)zbzt
(zb + βzt)
)− β(Vb − cH)zt
6(zb + βzt)
, and
pB∗ec = cE−
cE − c
3
+
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
− β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
.
If zb − zt > Vb − cH , then airlines’ equilibrium prices are
pA∗bu = c−
c− cE
3
+
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
− 2β(V b−cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
+ Vb,
pA∗ec = c−
c− cE
3
+
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
− 2β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
, and
pB∗ec = cE−
cE − c
3
+
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
− β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
.
When its self-selection constraint does not bind (zb − zt ≤ Vb − cH), airline
A’s equilibrium price for each type of class would be determined only by horizontal
diﬀerentiation of its own type of consumers in Case 1, as shown in Theorem 1. In
contrast, even in absence of binding self-selection constraint, airline A’s equilibrium
price for each class reﬂects horizontal diﬀerentiation of the both type of consumers in
Case 3. The reason is that its rival, airline B provides only economy class service for
both type of consumers in Case 3. When zb − zt > Vb − cH , airline A’s equilibrium
prices are set under a binding self-selection constraint, as in Case 1.
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1.4 The ﬁrst stage game equilibrium (SPE)
1.4.1 Structure of the SPE
Subgame perfect equilibria are illustrated in the following example. Let β = 0.25,
zb = 4, Vb = 4, c = 4 and c − cE = 0.5. Then, the cost advantages enjoyed by
low-cost airplanes are relatively small, 12.5 percent of c or Vb. Let zt and cH range
from 0.25 to 4, so that they would vary in a rectangular area [0− 3.75, 0− 3.75]8.
Figure 1.4.1 shows that three types of SPE each exist somewhere in the
range of (zb− zt, Vb− cH)9 and social beneﬁt from business class, Vb− cH , critically
aﬀects the type of SPE. Symmetric SPE in which the two ex ante identical airlines
choose the same higher cost structure, normal airplanes, exist when social beneﬁt
from business class is high, while symmetric SPE in which they choose the same
lower cost structure, low-cost airplanes, exist when social beneﬁt from business class
is low. Strikingly, when social beneﬁt from business class is moderate, there exist
asymmetric SPE in which ex ante identical airlines choose diﬀerent cost structures.
Let zb− zt > Vb− cH , with parameter ranges in the upper-left part of Figure
1.4.1. The boundary between the SPE with Case 1 and the SPE with Case 3
and boundary between the SPE with Case 2 and the SPE with Case 3 are mostly
downward sloping10. This implies that as tourists’ price sensitivity increases (zt ↓),
the airlines are more likely to choose a normal airplane.
Note that when zb − zt > Vb − cH , ∂p
i∗
bu(1)
∂zt
= ∂p
i∗
ec(1)
∂zt
<
∂pA∗bu (3)
∂zt
= ∂p
A∗
ec (3)
∂zt
<
8By excluding cases in which tourists are extremely price sensitive, I did not consider the SPE
in which airline A running a normal airplane serves only business class against airline B running a
low-cost airplane.
9Note that zb−zt represents the diﬀerence between the two types of consumers’ price sensitivity,
associated with horizontal diﬀerentiation, and Vb − cH represents the diﬀerence between business
travellers’ welfare increase and its cost, say, “social beneﬁt from business class”, associated with
vertical diﬀerentiation.
10Boundary between the SPE with Case 1 and the SPE with Case 3 are upward sloping when
tourists’ price sensitivity, zt, is very low.
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Above 45◦ line, self-selection constraints are binding.
Figure 1.1: Subgame perfect equilibria
∂pB∗ec (3)
∂zt
< ∂p
i∗
ec(2)
∂zt
, i = A,B11. That is, the eﬀect of an increase in the tourists’
price sensitivity on the equilibrium prices is largest in SPE with Case 2, while it is
smallest in SPE with Case 1. The intuition behind this is that when tourists’ price
sensitivity increases, airlines running normal airplanes would reduce their prices
less than airlines running low-cost airplanes due to their incentive to maintain the
business traveller markup. Thus, for lower value of zt, the airlines’ choice of a normal
airplane incurs less tight competition, relative to a low-cost airplane. This makes
airlines more likely to choose a normal airplane.
11I assume that airline A chooses a normal airplane and airline B chooses a low-cost airplane
in a SPE with Case 3. When zb − zt > Vb − cH , (i) ∂p
i∗
bu(1)
∂zt
=
∂pi∗ec(1)
∂zt
=
(1+β)z2b−β(Vb−cH )zb
(zb+βzt)
2 , (ii)
∂pi∗ec(2)
∂zt
=
(1+β)z2b
(zb+βzt)
2 , (iii)
∂pA∗bu (3)
∂zt
=
∂pA∗ec (3)
∂zt
=
3(1+β)z2b−2β(Vb−cH )zb
3(zb+βzt)
2 ,
∂pB∗ec (3)
∂zt
=
3(1+β)z2b−β(Vb−cH )zb
3(zb+βzt)
2 ,
where i = A,B.
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Although its low-cost airplane choice incurs tighter competition, airline B
may choose a low-cost airplane for very low values of zt (high zb − zt). Note that
when zt decreases, demand for airline B running a low-cost airplane increases much
faster at lower value of zt12. This may make its low-cost airplane choice more
proﬁtable even in tighter competition. Hence, for very low values of zt, there exists
an upward sloping boundary between the SPE with Case 1 and the SPE with Case
3.
Let zb−zt ≤ Vb−cH , with parameter ranges in the lower-right part of Figure
1.4.1. The boundary between the SPE with Case 1 and the SPE with Case 3 results
in a convex curve. The boundary between the SPE with Case 2 and the SPE with
Case 3 also does.
Note that when zb − zt ≤ Vb − cH , ∂
2p∗(2)
(∂zt)2
< ∂
2p∗(3)
(∂zt)2
< ∂
2p∗(1)
(∂zt)2
= 013. That is,
prices in equilibria with Case 2 are the most concave in zt, while those in equilibria
with Case 1 are the least concave in zt. Note that the price decrease at low values
of zt attracts tourists much more than that at high values of zt. Thus, an airline
running a low-cost airplane, attracting both types of consumers with only economy
class service, would reduce its price more when zt is low and decreasing than when zt
is high and decreasing. That is, an airline’s choice of a low-cost airplane incurs less
tight competition than a normal airplane for high values of zt, while it incurs tighter
competition for low values of zt. Hence, when zt is high and decreasing, airlines are
more likely to choose a low-cost airplane, which yields an upward sloping boundary.
When zt is low and decreasing, airlines are more likely to choose a normal airplane,
12Note that
∂DA∗bu (3)
∂zt
= β(Vb−cH )
6(zb+βzt)
2 and
∂DA∗ec (3)
∂zt
= c−cE
6z2t
− β
{
β(Vb−cH )
6(zb+βzt)
2
}
and thus
∂2DA∗bu (3)
(∂zt)2
< 0
and
∂2DA∗ec (3)
(∂zt)2
< 0.
13When zb − zt ≤ Vb − cH , (i) ∂p
i∗
bu(1)
∂zt
= 0,
∂pi∗ec(1)
∂zt
= 1, (ii)
∂pi∗ec(2)
∂zt
=
(1+β)z2b
(zb+βzt)
2 , (iii)
∂pA∗bu (3)
∂zt
=
3(1+β)z2b−β(Vb−cH )zb
6(zb+βzt)
2 ,
∂pA∗ec (3)
∂zt
= 1
2
+
3(1+β)z2b−β(Vb−cH )zb
6(zb+βzt)
2 ,
∂pB∗ec (3)
∂zt
=
3(1+β)z2b−β(Vb−cH )zb
3(zb+βzt)
2 , where
i = A,B.
14
which yields a downward sloping boundary.
Note that except when zb − zt is small and Vb − cH is large, airline B has
higher proﬁt than airline A in the SPE with Case 3. Figure 1.4.1 shows parameter
area in which airline B has higher proﬁt than airline A in the SPE with Case 3.
Intuitively, for high tourists’ price sensitivity, an airline running a low-cost airplane
can attract tourists easily at a little lower price, maintaining its high markup due
to its cost advantage. When social beneﬁt from business class is large, an airline
running a normal airplane can set a high price for business class due to business
travellers’ high willingness to pay for upgrade to business class.
1.4.2 Proﬁts, prices, and demands in the SPE
As in the Figure A.114, the proﬁt of an airline rises or drops discontinuously when
its rival changes the type of airplane, which makes the boundary between diﬀerent
types of SPE. In contrast, airlines changing their type of airplane have continuous
proﬁts at the boundary. This suggests that depending on the rival’s airplane type,
an airline should be faced with diﬀerent degree of competition.
Theorem 4 Suppose that zb − zt > Vb − cH . Then, pA∗ec (2) ≤ pA∗ec (3) ≤ pA∗ec (1) and
pA∗bu (3) ≤ pA∗bu (1), if and only if c− cE ≥ β(Vb−cH)ztzb+βzt . Suppose that zb − zt ≤ Vb − cH .
Then, pA∗ec (3) ≤ pA∗ec (1), if and only if c − cE ≥ β{3(zb−zt)−(Vb−cH)}zt2(zb+βzt) , and pA∗ec (2) ≤
pA∗ec (3), if and only if c− cE ≥ β{3(zb−zt)+(Vb−cH)}zt4(zb+βzt) . pA∗bu (3) ≤ pA∗bu (1), if and only if
c− cE ≥ 2β(Vb−cH)zt+3{(Vb−cH)−(zb−zt)}zb2(zb+βzt) .
Theorem 4 implies that the entry of low-cost carriers either decreases or in-
creases prices. When cost advantage is large, the entry of low-cost carriers decreases
both business class price and economy class price. Note that when social beneﬁt
14Figures A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6, A.7 and A.8 can be found in Appendix A.3. In those
ﬁgures, I assume that airline A runs a normal airplane and airline B runs a low-cost airplane in the
SPE with Case 3.
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from business class is high and tourists are price insensitive, the entry of low-cost
carriers increases the business class price, as shown in the Figure A.2 showing airline
A’s equilibrium prices. Figures A.2 and A.3 show that the entry of low-cost carriers
decreases all economy class prices.
Theorem 5 Assume that β = 0.25, zb = 4, c = 4 and c−cE = 0.5. Let (Di∗bu(3), Di∗ec(3)),
i = A,B, represent demands in asymmetric equilibrium in which airline A runs a
normal airplane and airline B runs a low-cost airplane. Then, D
A∗
bu (3)
DA∗bu (3)+D
B∗
bu (3)
(≡
D˜A∗bu (3)) >
DA∗ec (3)
DA∗ec (3)+DB∗ec (3)
(≡ D˜A∗ec (3)). When zb − zt ≤ Vb − cH , ∂D
A∗
bu (3)
∂zt
> 0 and
∂DA∗ec (3)
∂zt
|zt=zb < 0, ∂D
A∗
ec (3)
∂zt
|zt=z˜t = 0 and ∂
2DA∗ec (3)
(∂zt)2
< 0 where z˜t =
√
3β(1+β)zb−β2(Vb−cH)
2(c−cE) −
β. When zb − zt > Vb − cH , ∂D
A∗
ec (3)
∂zt
> 0 and ∂D
A∗
bu (3)
∂zt
> 0.
Figure A.4 shows the demand of airline A’s business and economy class ser-
vices in the subgame perfect equilibria. Each airline has the same demand in the
symmetric SPE with Case 1 and Case 2 regardless of zt, while airlines’ demands in
the SPE with Case 3 varies with zt. As shown in Theorem 5, when zb − zt > Vb−cH
and thus its self-selection constraint is binding, demand for both of airline A’s classes
decreases as tourists’ price sensitivity increases. In contrast, when zb − zt ≤ Vb− cH
and thus the self-selection constraint does not bind, demand for airline A’s economy
class may increase and demand for business class decreases as zt decreases.
1.4.3 The SPE with some changed parameters
This subsection investigates the changes of the SPE, incurred by changes of some
parameters, β and c − cE . Finally, Figure A.5 and A.6 show subgame perfect
equilibria and equilibria maximizing social welfare, respectively, when β = 0.35. The
area representing asymmetric SPE and the area representing asymmetric equilibria
maximizing social welfare shifts left, implying that as the proportion of business
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travellers increases, a normal airplane providing both classes is more likely to be
chosen in both SPE and socially optimal cost structures equilibria.
Figure A.5 and A.6 show subgame perfect equilibria and equilibria maximiz-
ing social welfare, respectively, when c− cE = 0.6. When cost advantage increases,
the entry of low-cost carriers is more likely to happen given consumer parameters.
However, note that almost all properties of the SPE in the above still maintain
regardless of β’s and c− cE ’s changes.
Figure A.9 and A.10 show subgame perfect equilibria and equilibria maxi-
mizing social welfare, respectively, when zt = 1 and zb ∈ [1, 5]. As in Figure 1.4.1,
when zb − zt is not large, asymmetric SPE are more likely to exist. That is, when
tourists are very price sensitive, an airline running a low-cost airplane can not get
high economy class markup and thus is not proﬁtable.
1.4.4 Comparison of the second stage equilibrium proﬁts
The second stage equilibrium proﬁts vary with the parameters representing con-
sumer preferences and costs (i.e. β, Vb − cH , zb, zt, and c − cE)15. In particular,
Theorem 3 shows some feasible comparisons between the second stage equilibrium
proﬁts16. Recall that p∗(s) is the equilibrium price when the cost structure in the
second stage is s ∈ S = {1, 2, 3}.
Lemma 3 Let Assumption 1 hold. When zb − zt ≤ Vb − cH , the equilibrium profit
functions have the following relations; (i) πiB/E (p
∗(1))−πiB/E (p∗(2)) = N1+β
{
β(zb−zt)2
2(zb+βzt)
}
,
∀i = A,B, (ii) if c − cE < β(V b−cH)ztzb+βzt , then πBE (p∗(3)) < πBE (p∗(2)) , and (iii)
if c − cE > β(Vb−cH)ztzb+βzt + 3
{√
zbzt − (1+β)zbztzb+βzt
}
,then πBE (p
∗(3)) > πBB/E (p
∗(1)) ,
15Equilibrium prices, demands, and proﬁts for all cases in the second stage are put in Appendix
A.2
16Note that a subgame perfect equilibrium should be determined through comparisons of the
second stage equilibrium proﬁts in Table 1.
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where p∗(1), p∗(2), and p∗(3) are the equilibrium prices of Case 1, Case 2, and
Case 3. When zb − zt > Vb − cH , they also have the following relations; (iv)
πiB/E (p
∗(1)) − πiE (p∗(2)) = N1+β
{
β(Vb−cH)(zb−zt)
2(zb+βzt)
}
, ∀i = A,B, (v) if c − cE <
β(Vb−cH)zt
zb+βzt
, then πB (p∗(3)) < πB (p∗(2)) , and (vi) if c− cE > β(Vb−cH)ztzb+βzt + 3X, then
πB (p∗(3)) > πB (p∗(1)) , where X =
√
((1+β)zbzt)
2+β(Vb−cH)(zb−zt)zbzt
zb+βzt
− (1+β)zbztz1+βzt .
Theorem 3 (i) and (iv) imply that as long as tourists are more price sensitive
than business travellers, each airline earns a higher proﬁt in Case 1 (separating
consumers) than in Case 2 (pooling consumers). Nonetheless, it is shown through
examples in the above subsection that there may exist a SPE with Case 2, if there
is a cost advantage of running a low-cost airplane. According to Theorem 3 (ii)
and (v), when c− cE < β(V b−cH)ztzb+βzt , airline B (low-cost airplane) has a higher proﬁt
in Case 2 in which it is competing against a rival with low-cost structure than in
Case 3 in which it is competing against a rival providing both classes of service.
This suggests that as its cost advantage gets smaller, a low-cost carrier might prefer
competing against another low-cost carrier to competing against an airline with both
classes. Theorem 3 (i), (iii), (iv) and (vi) imply that if c = cE , then the ex ante
identical airlines in the ﬁrst-stage game will make their choice of a normal airplane
the dominant strategy. Thus, Theorem 6 suggests that entry of the low-cost carriers
could be achieved through the cost advantages of the low-cost carriers.
Theorem 6 Suppose that c = cE. Then, there does not exist a symmetric SPE
with Case 2 or a SPE with Case 3.
According to Theorem 7, derived from Theorem 3 (iii) and (vi) and Theorem
4, the economy class prices drop when airline B changes to a low-cost ariplane, from
the SPE with Case 1 to the SPE with Case 3, and airline A changes to a low-cost
airplane, from the SPE with Case 3 to the SPE with Case 2.
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Theorem 7 pA∗ec (3) ≤ pA∗ec (1) in the boundary between the SPE with Case 1 and the
SPE with Case 3, and pA∗ec (2) ≤ pA∗ec (3) in the boundary between the SPE with Case
2 and the SPE with Case 3.
1.5 Social welfare analysis
In this section, I examine the airlines’ cost structures that maximize social welfare.
I consider a social planner problem in which the social planner chooses the airlines’
cost structures and then the airlines compete in the Hotelling model. The social
planner’s problem is
max
s
SW (s) = (πA∗(p∗(s) + πB∗(p∗(s)) + CS(p∗(s)),
where s ∈ S = {(B/E,B/E), (E,E), (E,B/E), (B/E,E)} and p∗(s) and CS(p∗(s))
are the second-stage equilibrium prices and aggregate consumer surplus respectively.
A consumer with ( θ, f) would have w− zθ|f − di| − piec from purchasing an
airline i’s economy class service, while she would have w+Vb− zθ|f − di| − pibu from
purchasing an airline i’s business class service. Then, aggregate consumer surplus
at equilibrium prices in the airlines’ cost structures, s ∈ S, is
CS(p∗(s)) =
βN
1 + β
{
∫ f∗bu(s)
0
(w − zbf − pA∗ec (s) + 1(bu)(Vb + pA∗ec (s)− pA∗bu (s)))df
+
∫ 1
f∗bu(s)
(w − zb(1− f)− pB∗ec (s) + 1(bu)(Vb + pB∗ec (s)− pB∗bu (s)))df}
+
N
1 + β
{
∫ f∗ec(s)
0
(w − ztf − pA∗ec (s))df +
∫ 1
f∗ec(s)
(w − zt(1− f)− pB∗ec (s))df}.
Figure 2 shows that symmetric higher cost equilibria maximize social welfare
when Vb − cH is high and symmetric lower cost equilibria do when Vb − cH is low.
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Above 45◦ line, self-selection constraints are binding.
Figure 1.2: Equilibria with cost structures maximizing social welfare
It is notable that there also are parameter ranges in which asymmetric equilibria
maximize social welfare.
Ignoring the costs incurred to consumers due to airline’s deviation from their
most preferred location, it would be socially desirable for all tourists to choose airline
B’s economy class service and all business travellers to choose airline A’s business
class service when c− cE < Vb−cH and it would be socially desirable for both type of
consumers to choose airline B’s economy class service when c− cE ≥ Vb− cH . From
this perspective, note that when c− cE < Vb − cH , any symmetric equilibria cause
misallocation between consumer types and the desirable airplane types17. I call
17Note that when c− cE ≥ Vb − cH , there is no misallocation in the SPE with Case 2. In
those parameter ranges, I found the symmetric lower-cost equilibria (the SPE with Case 2) socially
optimal.
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the cost from the undesirable allocation “the misallocation cost”. Theorem 5 shows
that asymmetric equilibria may reduce the misallocation cost and thus increase social
welfare, since the proportion of business travellers choosing airline A’s business class
is greater than that of tourists choosing its economy class18. Note that consumers’
costs from the airline’s deviation from their most preferred location are minimized
in each symmetric equilibria. I call the cost from the airline’s deviation “the airline
deviation cost”. As a result, asymmetric equilibria may incur the airline deviation
cost more than symmetric equilibria. Nonetheless, Figure 1.5 shows that there exist
asymmetric equilibria maximizing social welfare, implying that the decrease in the
misallocation cost in the asymmetric equilibria may be greater than the increase in
the airline deviation cost.
Let zb − zt ≤ Vb−cH . According to Theorem 5, when zt > z˜t and zt increases,
demand for airline A’s business class is increasing and demand for its economy class
is decreasing. Thus, as zt increases, the misallocation cost decreases in asymmetric
equilibria. Figure 1.5 shows that as zt increases, the area of the asymmetric equilibria
maximizing social welfare increases, implying that the decrease in the misallocation
cost is greater than the increase in the airline deviation cost19.
Let zb − zt > Vb − cH . By Theorem 5, as zt decreases, the demand for
airline A’s both classes decreases. Figure 1.5 shows that as zt decreases, the area
of the asymmetric equilibria maximizing social welfare increases, implying that the
decrease in the misallocation cost from tourists dominate the increase in the airline
deviation cost.
18If the proportions of business travellers and tourists choosing airline A are the same as in the
symmetric equilibria, the social welfare achieved in the asymmetric equilibria should be less than
the one achieved in either symmetric equilibria.
19Note that when zt < z˜t and zt decreases, airline A’s economy demand in asymmetric equilibria
is decreasing. Therefore, as zt decreases, the misallocation of tourists reduces, which may increase
the area of asymmetric equilibria maximizing social welfare.
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1.6 Conclusions
The entry and growth of the low-cost carriers are a puzzle, given the proﬁtability
of serving business travellers. This paper has explained the coexistence of two
types of airline services, diﬀerentiated and undiﬀerentiated, in the airline industry.
In particular, it has focused on the long-run equilibrium of the airline industry
by endogenizing ex ante identical airlines’ choices of airplanes with diﬀerent cost
structures. I showed that there exist three types of subgame perfect equilibria
and without cost advantages, entry of low-cost carriers serving an undiﬀerentiated
product would not be proﬁtable.
In reality, low-cost carriers and major airlines have entered and exited in
many city-pair markets. Nonetheless, it is known that major airlines cluster in
medium and long haul markets, while low-cost carriers cluster in short haul markets.
It is reported that low-cost carriers have started to enter the medium haul markets
and have succeeded there during the past decade. The model shows that asymmetric
equilibria exist when the social beneﬁt of business class service or cost advantage
(savings) is moderate. It also shows that symmetric higher cost equilibria exist
when the social beneﬁt of business class service is large or the cost advantage is
small, while symmetric lower cost equilibria exist when the social beneﬁt of business
class service is small or the cost advantage is high. Although the relation between
the social beneﬁt of business class service and the travelling distance is an issue to
estimate, it seems to be correlated.
I expained the entry of low-cost carriers into hub-spoke markets of major
airlines and their growth by showing that an airline running a low-cost airplane has
higher proﬁts than an airline running a normal airplane in the most parameters of
the asymmetric equilibria, when tourists are somehow price sensitive or when social
beneﬁt of business class service is not much high.
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I showed that both subgame perfect equilibria and equilibria maximizing
social welfare are aﬀected critically by the cost advantage and social beneﬁt of
business class service and they are coincident each other in many parameters. In
particular, I showed that asymmetric equilibria reduce the misallocation between
desirable airplane types and traveller types found in symmetric equilibria.
My analysis limits the airlines’ choice of cost structures to either a low-
cost airplane or a normal airplane. It would be interesting to analyze three types
of airplanes – a normal airplane, a low-cost airplane and a business airplane20. I
conjecture that there may be another types of asymmetric equilibria, in which an
airline running a business airplane and an airline running a normal airplane compete,
or in which an airline running a business airplane and an airline running a low-cost
airplane compete.
20The economist (Oct. 13, 2005) reported that two new carriers, ‘eos’ and ‘Maxjet’, providing
only business class service, would enter the transatlantic route between London and New York.
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Chapter 2
Measuring the Eﬀect of Branch
Network in the Korean Banking
Industry
2.1 Introduction
In Korea, before 1980, only a few nationwide commercial banks competed under
government regulation. Regional banks that entered the market in the late 1960s
were restricted to locating their branches only in their own provinces. With govern-
ment deregulation in the 1980s, many new nationwide banks entered the market. As
a result, Korean banks had widely divergent branch networks by the mid-1990’s1.
The purpose of this paper, then, is to ﬁnd out how the widely divergent branch
network structures aﬀected the banks’ market powers in the period between 1994
and 1996.
1From 1990 to 1996, the total number of branches of all commercial banks increased by more
than two times – from 2,032 to 4,606 total branches. The number of branches ranges from 90 to
444 for nationwide banks and from 45 to 201 for regional banks in 1996
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The banking industry is characterized by diﬀerentiated services. Banks com-
pete for depositors by providing various services such as deposit services, easy access,
consulting, foreign exchange, bill payment, and other services. For instance, hav-
ing a superior branch network to other banks would provide depositors with much
closer access and thereby potentially increase a bank’s competitiveness. Recently,
several papers (Dick, 2002, Adams et al., 2004, Knittel and Stango, 2003) started
to apply a diﬀerentiated product demand model to the banking industry. Although
many issues regarding banks’ branch activities have been debated in the banking
industry, those papers nonetheless do not address the strategic aspects of banks’
branching activities in demand estimation.
Cerasi et al. (2002) and Pinho (2000) focus on the eﬀect of deregulation on
branching activities and deposit interest rates by modelling the banks’ strategic
choices of branch network. Grzelonska (2005) conﬁrms the importance of branch
networks, showing the positive eﬀect of the proximity of branches on the level of
deposits per branch, and Knittel and Stango (2004) and Ishii (2004) examine the
eﬀect of interconnection pricing of ATM network on competition, consumer welfare,
and the investment of ATM network. Although they are concerned with the strategic
aspects of banks’ branch networks, they do not examine the eﬀect of banks’ branch
networks on competition between banks. To my knowledge, there is no prior analysis
of the relationship between a bank’s branch network and its market power (price
competition) in the banking industry through the modelling of a bank’s choice of
branch networks as well as deposit interest rates.
This paper builds on a discrete choice demand model in an equilibrium frame-
work (Berry et al., 1995, Draganska and Jain, 2004) to model the bank’s choices
of deposit interest rate and branch network as well as depositors’ choices of which
bank to use for deposit services. I use a generalized method of moments to estimate
the system of equations in the model, including supply-side equations as well as
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demand-side equation. The demand equation to estimate is obtained by modelling
the depositor’s optimal choice of a bank for deposit services. The bank’s ﬁrst order
conditions of deposit interest rates and branch networks for proﬁt maximization
yields the supply equations. These allow for the bank’s optimal choice of deposit
interest rates to be associated with their branch activities. This modelling strategy
provides an explicit estimation of cost parameters, the improvement of estimation
eﬃciency by allowing for correlation between disturbances, and reveal the interde-
pendency between deposit interest rates and branch network. Commercial banks
in Korea can be divided into three categories of banks, according to their branch
network structures2. All estimated results are analyzed based on the average values
within three categories of banks with widely divergent branch networks.
The results indicate that all the coeﬃcients of deposit services, such as branch
density, staﬃng, the bank’s age, and provision of foreign exchange, are positive. Re-
cently established branches attract relatively few depositors, implying that deposi-
tors have switching costs. Based on the logit results, the estimated markups vary
from 2.2% (medium-sized banks) to 2.3% (big 6 banks) and 2.8% (regional banks).
The estimated coeﬃcient for the deposit interest rate in the logit model yields the
price elasticity of demand 2.5-4.03. Interestingly, the estimated markups and price
elasticity of demand are the largest for regional banks with ‘intensive’ branch net-
work that locates many branches in a few markets. It suggests the close relationship
between a bank’s branch network and its price elasticity of demand. The estimated
markups and price elasticities were stable over the period (1994-1996), implying
2There are two categories of nationwide banks divided by entry year, and regional banks. I will
call nationwide banks established before 1980 the “big 6 banks”, due to high branch network sizes,
and nationwide banks established after 1980 the “medium-sized banks”.
3The Lerner index as a market power index is the inverse of the price elasticity and it shows 0.30-
0.31 for big 6 banks, 0.25-0.27 for medium-sized banks, and 0.37-0.39 for regional banks, indicating
that regional banks have the highest Lerner index and big 6 banks have higher Lerner index than
medium-sized banks.
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that branching competition did not change markups or market power.
Based on the estimated cross price elasticity of demand, a change in the
deposit interest rate of nationwide banks aﬀects the demand of other nationwide
banks much more than that of regional banks. But, those change of regional banks
rarely aﬀects any other banks. The results suggest that overlap between diﬀerent
banks’ branch networks increases competition between them.
The results indicate that banks established their branches more in markets
with higher branch elasticities. Regional banks have a higher branch density than
other categories of banks, given the same branch elasticity, which is ascribed to their
lower cost of branch and higher markup. The estimated concave preference over
branch density may give an explanation for nationwide banks’ ‘extensive’ branch
network that locates small number of branches in many markets.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a review of the related
literature. Section 3 and Section 4 provide background on the Korean banking
industry and describe the data used in this paper. In Section 5, I introduce the
structural demand model and supply model and suggest the estimation method.
Results, including network analysis, are presented in Section 6. Section 7 summa-
rizes the paper and suggests future research.
2.2 Literature Review
Dick (2002) was the ﬁrst to apply a structural demand model to the banking indus-
try4. She estimates a demand model for commercial bank deposit services using both
a logit model and a nested logit model. Based the logit and nested logit estimates,
she ﬁnds the median of the price elasticities to be 5.9 and 10.9 respectively, with
4Recently, the empirical industrial organization economists have developed discrete choice de-
mand models with applications to various diﬀerentiated products, such as automobiles, cereals,
movies, and so on (Berry et al., 1995, Nevo, 2001, Davis, 2004).
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implying that the nested logit model improves the estimates of the price elasticities.
She also evaluates whether the deregulation of banks’ geographic diversiﬁcation is
an appropriate policy in terms of consumer welfare. Adams et al. (2004) focus
on the substitutability of depository institutions using a generalized extreme value
framework5– thrifts and banks, single-market and multi-market institutions. They
ﬁnd signiﬁcant market segmentations in both dimensions.
However, these papers do not exploit information such as cost variables in the
supply side. My analysis builds on a discrete choice demand model in an equilibrium
framework developed by Draganska and Jain (2005). Draganska and Jain (2005)
explicitly model a ﬁrm’s decision of product-line length as well as price in the yogurt
market. They derive the supply equations from the price and line length decisions
of the oligopoly ﬁrms and then estimate simultaneous equation model by combining
them with a discrete choice demand model.
Grzelonska (2005) focuses on the eﬀect of the geography of other branches
in the network on the deposit amount of one bank branch. She ﬁnds that the
convenience of a bank’s branch network positively aﬀects its deposit amounts. Kiser
(2002) illustrates the importance of location on a consumer’s choice of depository
institution using data from the Michigan Surveys of Consumers. Cohen and Mazzeo
(2005) model the branching decision of banks with allowing for the endogeneity of
market structure and product diﬀerentiation. Knittel and Stango (2004) and Ishii
(2004) examine the eﬀect of the incompatibility of ATM networks6 on the consumer
welfare and investment in ATM networks, with focusing on the importance of the
ATM network in the consumer’s decision.
Cerasi et al. (2002) test the eﬀect of deregulation on nine EEC banking
5They use a discrete choice model suggested by Bresnahan et al. (1997), which enables more
ﬂexible market segmentation testing than the nested logit model.
6Surcharging or interconnection pricing creates a partial incompatibility between banks’ ATM
networks by price discriminating between aﬃliated and unaﬃliated consumers.
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industries in the period from 1990 to 1996 by modelling the strategic aspects of
branching activities. Their econometric test is derived by separating the eﬀects of
the toughness of price competition and branching cost on the branching activities.
Pinho (2000) also examines the impact of deregulation on competition between
banks in the Portugese banking industry. Pinho (2000) focuses on diﬀerent responses
in the non-price competition of old institutions and new small institutions in the
deregulation process. He shows that the smaller institutions expanded advertising
and branch activities much more than did the larger institutions. In contrast, this
paper examines the eﬀect of widely divergent branch networks on market power in
the Korean banking industry during the deregulation period.
One of the main issues in the Korean banking industry – banks’ changes in
the technological systems during the deregulation process after 1980 – is reviewed
by Gilbert and Wilson (1998). By using Malmquist indexes of productivity change,
they found that Korean banks substantially changed their mix of inputs and outputs,
making large enhancements in productivity during privatization and the deregula-
tion period. This paper is complementary to Gilbert and Wilson (1998), in that
it examines the competition between banks given the enhanced productivity after
deregulation process.
2.3 The Korean Banking Industry
Until the end of the 1970s, only a few nationwide commercial banks competed under
Korean government control7. The government control over the banking sector aimed
mainly to support export-led economic growth. Government-owned specialized
7The nationwide banks are Cho-heung bank, Sang-up bank, Je-il bank, Han-il bank, and Seoul
bank. Cho (1998) discusses the ﬁnancial sector policies in the period from 1960s to 1980s and
ﬁnancial reforms in the 1990s.
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banks8 were established in the 1960s to support speciﬁc sectors. Privately-owned
regional banks were also established in the late 1960s. These banks were allowed to
locate their branches in their own provinces, but not outside those provinces9.
Realizing the limit of its control over the ﬁnancial sector at the end of 1970s,
the Korean government started to lift many regulations controlling the management
and operations of banks. The ownership of many nationwide commercial banks was
released from the government hands by 1983. During this period, the Korean govern-
ment began indirect control through the management of bank reserve requirements.
The government also encouraged the establishment of new banks by lowering regula-
tory restrictions on entry into the market. Two new nationwide commercial banks,
namely Shinhan Bank and Koram Bank, were established in 1982 and 1983, respec-
tively. In addition, the Korea Exchange Bank converted to a nationwide commercial
bank in 198910. Three other new commercial banks (Dong-hwa bank, Dong-nam
bank and Dae-dong bank) were established in 1989. Hana Bank and Boram bank
were established in 1991 and Peace Bank in 1992. Deregulation of bank manage-
ment and the establishment of many new banks characterized the Korean banking
industry during 1980s and early 1990s.
In the early 1990s, the Korean government started to reform the ﬁnancial
system by lifting regulations on interest rates on deposits and loans. A 4-stage plan
for interest rate deregulation was announced. In 1991, deregulation was applied
only to deposits with maturities of at least three years under the ﬁrst stage of the
plan. The second stage, undertaken in 1993, lifted regulation on interest rates for
8e.g., Korea Development Bank, the National Agricultural/Fisheries Cooperatives Federation,
the Industrial Bank of Korea, the Citizens National Bank, the Korea Exchange Bank, and Korea
Housing Bank.
9The only exception was that they were able to locate branches in Seoul, although only one
branch per bank was permitted.
10In 1995 and 1997, the Citizen National Bank and Korea Housing Bank also converted to
nationwide commercial banks.
30
long-term deposits with maturities of two years or more. In 1994, the period of the
third stage, deposit rates with maturities of at least one year were deregulated. In
1995, the government extended deregulation of deposit rates to all deposits except
for demand deposits.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Data Source
My data come from various sources. Annual data on all commercial banks11 and
demographics in each market are available for the years 1994-1996. The data in-
clude amount of each branch’s deposits, number of employees, provision of foreign
exchange, branch address, and its year of inception from year books published in
the Korea Federation of Banks. I use each bank’s deposit interest rates and loan
interest rates and a bank-level cost variable such as expenditure-per-employees from
the Bank Management Statistics published in the Financial Supervisory Service. I
use market interest rates such as yields of CDs or yields of corporate bonds from
the Bank of Korea. Data on the population, business, and market area size were
obtained from the Korea National Statistical Oﬃce.
2.4.2 Bank characteristics
I model the depositor’s choice problem in terms of which bank she chooses given
the banks’ characteristics in each market. I divide each bank’s service into two
dimensions – branch numbers (density) and average branch service in a market.
The bank characteristics used to construct the explanatory variables that aﬀect
depositor utility include deposit interest rate, the number of bank branch oﬃces in
11They include data on nationwide banks, regional banks, and government owned banks.
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the market, the bank’s age, the number of employees per branch, the percentage of
bank branches serving foreign exchange, and the percentage of recently established
bank branches.
The number of bank branches may aﬀect depositors’ utility positively by
providing easier access to the bank. The Bank’s age proxies for bank reputation,
since depositors may think those banks are more secure. The number of employees
per branch and the percentage of branches serving foreign exchange represent deposit
associated service qualities the bank provides. Finally, I added the ratios of recently
established branches to total branches as explanatory variables in the model, so that
it could allow for disadvantages coming from costs incurred to the consumer from
switching banks. It is likely that depositors may not change banks due to the costs
of breaking the contract for their deposit.
2.4.3 Geographic Markets
I deﬁne 113 local geographic areas in each year as “markets”12. Smaller administra-
tive districts in the metropolitan areas are deﬁned as “markets”. The 113 markets
consist of 52 metropolitan areas and 61 local cities. With 3 years of panel data, I
have 339 market observations.
Table B.2 and Table B.3 provide a brief summary of the markets for two
categories of areas. Markets in the metropolitan area have around 0.4 million people
and 51km2 in area13, while geographically separated local cities have average 0.2
12Rural areas and very small cities are omitted, since there are few branches in those areas. I
omitted 5 small cities that have less than 30,000 population or 0.05 population per kilometer square,
and I ruled out all rural areas. The deposit amounts in these markets, including rural areas, take
on only less than 5% of the total market deposit amounts.
13Markets deﬁned in the metropolitan area have a problem in that consumers who are near a
boundary line are likely to choose a bank across the geographic market. Thus this market deﬁnition
would be sensible based on the restrictive assumption that few depositors choose a bank across
geographic markets. Although it may be problematic, the market deﬁnition having, on average, 0.4
million people and 51 km2 in area is still a big market and probably does not give as much bias.
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million people and 114km2 in area. Markets vary in the number of competitors and
their branch network. In 1996, markets in the metropolitan area had an average of
11 banks and 56 branches. Local cities had an average of 8 banks and 34 branches
in the same year.
2.4.4 Market Shares
I obtain the total deposits held by each bank in each market during the sample
period from the Korea Federation of Banks. The data include not only nationwide
commercial banks and regional banks but also government-owned, specialized banks.
I deﬁne the deposit amounts of each bank in the market over the sum of deposit
amounts of all banks including government-owned banks in the market as the bank’s
“market share”. I assume that depositors choose at least one bank and deposit their
money. In particular, I deﬁne the government owned banks as “the outside good”.
Then, they choose either one bank (among nationwide banks and regional banks)
or the government-owned banks14. This measure of market share is based on the
assumption that depositors would save their money in one of various depository
institutions.
Each bank’s market share in various markets is based on the deposit amounts
held by each bank. Deposits here include checking (deposit) account balances, sav-
ings, and other time deposits such as money markets and CDs. Thus, a market
share is determined by shares of various products. Only total deposit amounts are
available at each branch level. Given this data constraint, this measure might be
problematic. Following the observation of the Survey of Consumer Finances that
consumers are likely to acquire banking services together (Amel and Starr-McCluer,
14Knittel and Stango (2004) deﬁne market share as the ratio of deposit amounts held by each
bank to the total deposit amounts of all banks including credit unions and they use credit unions’
deposits to calculate the share of the outside good.
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2001), a high correlation between products helps to mitigate signiﬁcant measurement
error.
2.5 The model
I formulate a discrete choice demand model that allows consumers to choose a
bank for deposit services such as checking, savings, time deposit accounts, and
money market funds. Banks are assumed to maximize proﬁts by setting deposit
interest rates and choosing their branch network. I will estimate demand and supply
simultaneously in an equilibrium framework, as suggested by Berry et al. (1995).
Following Lancaster (1966), banks are deﬁned by their characteristics and
consumers are endowed with preferences for characteristics. The discrete choice logit
model (McFadden (1973)) then builds aggregate demand from depositors’ random
utility for the characteristics of the products. The diﬀerentiated products demand
model should be associated with demand estimation of the large number of products.
On the supply side, banks will be assumed to compete in deposit interest
rates and branch network in a Bertrand-Nash fashion. By explicitly modelling the
banks’ choice of branch network, I will account for the interdependency between
price and branch network decisions and evaluate the bank branch network as a
competitive tool.
2.5.1 Consumer choice
Discrete choice demand models have been explored in diﬀerentiated product markets
such as automobiles, cereal, movies, etc. Here, I follow the discrete choice method-
ology, the logit model and the nested logit model, to estimate deposit demand in
the banking industry.
Consumers are interested in purchasing deposit services from a bank. Assume
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that m = 1, 2, ...M markets are observed in each period t = 1, 2, ...T , each with
i = 1, 2, ...Itm depositors and j = 1, 2, ...Jtm ﬁrms. The utility consumer i derives
from a bank j at the market m at time t is given by
Uijtm = U(εijtm, rdjt, xjtm, brjtm, ξjt; θd) (2.1)
= μijtm + εijtm = xjtmβi + αirdjt + f
i(brjtm) + ξjtm + εijtm
where εijtm is a mean zero random disturbance and μijtm(= xjtmβi + αirdjt +
f i(brjtm) + ξjtm) is the mean utility of consumer i. rdjt represents deposit interest
rate paid by bank j, f i(brjmt) represents consumer preference over the accessibility
to the bank, xjtm is a K-dimensional row vector of the observed characteristics of
the bank j in a market tm, and ξjtm represents the bank j’s speciﬁc unobserved
characteristics in the market. I assume that observed bank characteristics are in-
dependent of unobserved bank characteristics15. I assume that consumer i’s utility
for the outside goods is given by Ui0mt = εi0mt. Assuming a uniform distribution of
bank oﬃces and bank customers, there is an inverse relationship between distance
travelled and the number of banking facilities per square mile. Thus, accessibility
can be measured as the number of banking facilities per square mile.
A Preference over the Access to a Bank: I assume that consumers
have a preference for accessibility of a bank16. Then, the contribution of bank j’s
15Price variables (deposit interest rates) and branch density are assumed to correlated with the
bank’s unobserved characteristics in the market and thus instrument variables are needed.
16Kiser (2002) reports the importance of location in the consumer choice of depository institution
from the Michigan Surveys of Consumers. Following Evanoﬀ (1988), I take the number of banking
facilities per square mile for a measure of the access to bank. “...Ideally, a measure of service
accessibility would incorporate the characteristics of time, distance, and cost incurred in obtaining
ﬁnancial services. Absent a direct measure of time and cost, some gauge of average distance travelled
would be an appropriate proxy.” Evanoﬀ (1988).
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branches to the consumer i’s expected utility is assumed to be given by
f i(brjmt) = φi1 ×
brjmt
market area size
+ φi2 ×
{
brjmt
market area size
}2
, (2.2)
where φi1 and φ
i
2 represent the magnitudes of the consumer i’s marginal utility for
the increase in the branch density. By adding the square of branch density, I allow
for either concave or convex consumer utility for branch network.
Market Shares: Each consumer i chooses the bank j that maximizes her
utility, so that she chooses it whenever U(εijtm, τjtm; θd)  U(εiktm, τktm; θd), for
k = 0, 1, ..., J and k = j, where τktm = (rdkt, xktm, brktm, ξktm) denotes the bank j’s
observed and unobserved characteristics and k = 0 represents the outside alterna-
tive. The distribution of consumer characteristics is assumed to be known. The set
of consumers that choose the bank j at time t in a market m is
Ajtm = {εijtm : U(εijtm, τjtm; θd)  U(εiktm, τktm; θd) for k = 0, 1, ..., Jtm, k = j}.
(2.3)
The market share of bank j is thus obtained by integrating out the set of
consumers choosing the bank j over the distribution. Given a density f(
) for 
, the
market share of bank j under the logit or nested logit assumption is
sjtm(τjtm; θd) =
∫
∈Ajtm
f(
)d
. (2.4)
Given the market share, demand for bank j at time t in a market m is
deﬁned as a multiplication of market size and market share, Mtmsjtm(τjtm; θd).
Total demand for bank j at time t is obtained by summing its demand across all
markets,
∑
m
Mtmsjtm(τjtm; θd).
A Logit Model: A simplifying yet restrictive assumption regarding con-
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sumer heterogeneity is that the random error εij is i.i.d. extreme value with the
distribution function exp(− exp(−
)), and it enters utility only through an additive-
separable form17. It also assumes no random coeﬃcients, θi = θ. By integrating the
individual utilities over random disturbances, ε, the market shares of bank j and
outside goods are respectively
sj(μ; θd) =
exp(μj)∑Jtm
k=0 exp(μk)
(2.5)
s0(μ; θd) =
1∑Jtm
k=0 exp(μk)
. (2.6)
For outside goods, the mean utility of the outside good is normalized to zero, Ui0mt =
εi0mt. Taking logs of market shares, the following structural linear equation,
ln(sj)− ln(s0) = μj − μ0 ≡ xjβ + αrdj + f(brj) + ξj , (2.7)
is obtained. In this model, the derivatives of market share with respect to deposit
interest rate are
∂sj
∂rdj
= αsj(1− sj) (2.8)
∂sk
∂rdj
= αsjsk. (2.9)
The logit model assumes homogeneous tastes for observable characteristics, hence
restricting diﬀerent consumers to have only diﬀerent i.i.d. shock. As stressed in
the literature, the i.i.d. structure of the random shock is problematic for the cross-
price elasticities. The increase in the deposit interest rate of a bank j probably
makes some depositors who had previously chosen it move to other banks. Due to
17I have dropped subscripts indicating observations, such as t and m, when explaining the logit
and nested logit model.
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the i.i.d. structure of random utility, the number of depositors who will move to
other banks is proportional to the market share of those banks, regardless of their
characteristics. It would be logical to assume that depositors move to banks that
have similar characteristics to bank j.
A Nested Logit Model: In contrast to the simple logit model, the nested
logit model still assumes the extreme value distribution but allows consumer tastes
to be correlated across similar products. Given the group of the products in G+1
exhaustive and mutually exclusive sets, g, g = 0, 1, 2, ..., G, the utility of depositor
i is assumed to be Uij = μj + ζig + (1− σ)εij , where μj ≡ xjβ + αrdj + f(brj) + ξj
and εij is i.i.d. extreme value. For consumer i, the variable ζig is a random variable
common to all products in group g. According to Cardell, ζig + (1− σ)εij also has
an extreme value distribution under some regularity conditions. The market share
of the product j can be divided into the share of product j(∈ g), conditional on
the choice of the group g and the group g’s share. Referring to Berry (1994), the
market share of the product j is given by
sj(μ;σ, θd) = sj|g(μ;σ, θd)sg(μ;σ, θd) =
exp(μj/(1− σ))
Dg
D1−σg∑
g D
(1−σ)
g
, (2.10)
where Dg ≡
∑
j∈g
exp(μj/(1 − σ)). With μ0 ≡ 0 and D0 = 1 for the outside good,
s0(μj ;σ, θd) = 1∑
g D
(1−σ)
g
. Taking logs of market shares,
ln(sj)− ln(s0) = μj/(1− σ)− σ ln(Dg). (2.11)
Taking the log of the group share, ln(Dg) = (ln(sg) − ln(s0))/(1 − σ), where sg
represents the observed group share. Substituting this into the equation (11) and
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combining terms give
ln(sj)− ln(s0) = xjβ + αrdj + f(brj) + σ ln(sj|g) + ξj , (2.12)
where sj|g(= sj/sg) is the market share of product j as a fraction of the total group
share. As the estimated parameter σ (0  σ < 1) approaches one, the within group
correlation goes to one. It implies that when price goes up, consumers who have
chosen a product j in a group would probably change to another product in the same
group rather than change to one in to another groups. Since the last term in the left
side sj|g is endogenous, it requires additional exogenous variables that are correlated
with the within group share. As suggested in the literature, the characteristics of
other banks in the group will be taken as instrument variables. In this model, the
derivatives of market shares with respect to deposit interest rate are
∂sj
∂rdj
=
α
(1− σ)sj [1− σsj|g − (1− σ)sj ] (2.13)
∂sk
∂rdj
=
α
(1− σ)sj [σsk|g + (1− σ)sk], where k, j ∈ g (2.14)
∂sk
∂rdj
=
α
(1− σ)sj [(1− σ)sk], where k /∈ g, j ∈ g. (2.15)
2.5.2 Bank’s branching and pricing strategies
Banks are assumed to compete in prices and branch network in a Bertrand-Nash
fashion. I assume that the banks have a uniform pricing policy across locally geo-
graphic markets in each period. rljt denotes bank j’s loan interest rate
18. In each
period t bank j determines the branch network and deposit interest rates to maxi-
18Alternatively, following Pinho (2000), bank j’s proﬁt function is Πjt =
∑
m{Mtmsjtm(rst − ρ−
rdjt−mcjt)−gjtm(brjtm)}, where rst denotes the market interest rates (e.g. yields of CDs) in period
t and ρ denotes the cash reserve rate, usually 5% - 10%. Results from a market interest rate are
very similar to those from banks’ loan interest rates.
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mize proﬁts:
max
{rdjt,brjtm}
Πjt =
∑
m
{Mtmsjtm(rljt − rdjt −mcjt)− gjtm(brjtm)}, (2.16)
where mcjt denotes the bank j’s marginal cost of providing deposit service and
gjtm(brjtm) represents the bank j’s cost function of branching activity.
The ﬁrst order condition for the deposit interest rate set by bank j is given
by
∂Πjt
∂rdjt
= −
∑
m
Mtmsjtm +
∑
m
Mtm
∂sjtm
∂rdjt
(rljt − rdjt −mcjt) = 0. (2.17)
The marginal cost consists of the cost shifters such as wages or factor prices, jt,
and unobserved shocks to marginal cost, ηjt: mcjt = ′jtγj + ηjt. It is assumed that
ηjt is constant across markets for a given bank and independent of εijtm. However,
it may be expected that any unobserved bank characteristics ξjtm that inﬂuence
depositor decisions might also aﬀect the unobserved cost component, ηjt. With the
marginal cost speciﬁcation and ∂sjtm
∂rdjt
= αsjtm(1− sjtm), the ﬁrst order condition of
the deposit interest rate becomes the estimating equation as follows:
rlt − rdjt = ′jtγj +
∑
m Mtmsjtm
α
∑
m Mtmsjtm(1− sjtm)
+ ηjt. (2.18)
The ﬁrst order condition for branch network choice of bank j is given by
∂Πjt
∂brjtm
= Mtm
∂sjtm
∂brjtm
(rljt − rdjt −mcjt)− g′jtm(brjtm) = 0. (2.19)
I also assume that g′jtm(brjtm) = δj1 + δtm2 + δj3brjtm + νjtm and νjtm are random
ﬂuctuations in the marginal costs of forming a branch network. The ﬁrst term in the
right side is the marginal beneﬁt from having a branch network, which can be divided
into the market demand response from increasing the branch network and the price
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cost markup. The marginal cost is assumed to vary across banks and markets. I
assume that it is linear in the number of branches so that the cost of having branch
network would have a quadratic function, be it convex or concave. The unobserved
bank characteristics ξjtm might be correlated with an unobserved cost component,
νjtm. Combining the equations (2.17), (2.19) and
∂sjtm
∂brjtm
= f ′(brjtm)sjtm(1− sjtm),
the estimating equation for the branch network is given by
0 =
f ′(brjtm)Mtmsjtm(1− sjtm)
∑
m Mtmsjtm
α
∑
m Mtmsjtm(1− sjtm)
−δj1−δtm2−δj3brjtm+νjtm. (2.20)
2.5.3 Estimation Issues
Estimation method
I use the generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure to estimate the system
of supply and demand equations. I follow a moment approach (Berry et al, 1995,
suggested) using the instruments for both demand and supply equations as observed
product characteristics (except deposit interest rates and branch density), Xjtm, and
cost shifters, Wjtm. The maintained assumption is that at the population parameter
values, θ0, the supply and demand unobservables [ξjtm(θ0), ηjt(θ0), νjtm(θ0)] have
zero means conditional on the instrument variables, Zjtm = [Xjtm,Wjtm], which is
given by
E[ξjtm(θ0)|Zjtm] = E[ηjt(θ0)|Zjtm] = E[νjtm(θ0)|Zjtm] = 0. (2.21)
Let ωjtm(θ) = [ξjtm(θ)′, ηjt(θ)′, νjtm(θ)′]′ be a 3 × 1 matrix with the un-
observed bank characteristics and the shock for marginal costs in each market
tm and ωj = [ω
′
j11, ...ω
′
jtm, ..., ω
′
jTM ]
′ be 3(2M + 1)T × 1 matrix19. Let Zj =
19For a bank j, both ξjtm and νjtm vary across markets and years with TM observations, but
ηjt varies only across years with T observations.
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[Z
′
j11, ...Z
′
jtm, ..., Z
′
jTM ]
′ be 3(2M + 1)T × K matrix of instrument variables for j
bank’s equations. Then, I can construct orthogonality conditions, Z ′jωj(θ), using
the instrument covariates, Zj , that are mean independent of ωj(θ). ω(θ) and Z are
given by
ω(θ) =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ω1(θ)
ω2(θ)
:
:
ωJ(θ)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
and Z =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Z1 0 0
0 Z2 0
. . .
. . .
0 0 . . ZJ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
. (2.22)
Let Z ′ω(θ) be the stacked vector of moment conditions for the whole system.
Then, G(θ) = Z ′ω(θ) will be the set of moments that enter the GMM objective
function, while assuming the population moment conditions, E[G(θ0)] = 0. The
GMM estimator solves for the θ that sets these moments as close to zero as possible.
I use a two-step optimal weighted GMM. In the ﬁrst stage, I use an identity matrix as
a weight matrix to obtain a consistent estimate, θ̂1. Then the estimated parameters
in the second stage solve
θ̂ = argmin
θ
ω(θ)′ZΣ̂−1Z ′ω(θ), (2.23)
where Σ̂ = v̂ar(Z ′ω(θ̂1))20. θ̂ has an asymptotical normal distribution with variance-
covariance matrix
(Γ′AΓ)−1Γ′AV AΓ(Γ′AΓ)−1, (2.24)
where Γ = ∂G(θ0)∂θ and V = E[Z
′ω(θ)ω(θ)′Z].
20The optimal weighting matrix is given by the inverse of the expected variance-covariance matrix
of the orthogonality conditions, denoted Σ = var(Z′ω).
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Instrument variables
Instrument variables are required for deposit interest rates, branch density, and
within group share for the nested logit model21. Following Berry et al. (1995), I
use sum of other observed characteristics of rival banks. While competitors’ charac-
teristics are exogenous from one bank’s perspective (ξjtm), they are correlated with
the bank’s deposit interest rate in that they are associated with the substitutability
of the bank. I use sums of observed characteristics in the group as the instrument
variables for the within group share, which Bresnahan et al. (1997) suggested with
similar arguments as above. I use one year lagged branch density as instrument vari-
ables for branch density, since it is likely to be correlated with the costs of forming
the current branch network.
2.6 The Results
2.6.1 Basic Analysis
Table B.4 shows the estimation results of demand parameters using the GMM
method. Estimates in the ﬁrst two columns result from the IV logit assumption,
while those in the last two columns come from the nested logit assumption. The
signs of all parameters in both models are the same as expected. Depositor utility
for branch density is concave, meaning that they derive less marginal utility when
branch density increases. Proxies for service quality per branch, such as the aver-
age logarithm of employees per branch and the branch portion of serving foreign
exchange, have positive signs. The coeﬃcient of the logarithm of bank age is also
positive. It is likely that when they switch banks, depositors might pay a penalty for
breaking their established deposit contract. As explanatory variables for this switch-
21These variables are endogenous in that they are likely correlated with unobserved bank char-
acteristics ξjtm.
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ing cost, I added the portions of recently established branches, such as one-year-old
branches, two-years-old branches, and three-years-old branches, to the regression.
There is a notable disadvantage for recently established branches due to depositors’
switching costs.
Two important coeﬃcients in Table B.4 need to be explained. First, demand
models eventually focus on the magnitude of consumers’ responses to price, typically
price elasticity of demand. As deﬁned in equation 1, ∂sj
∂rdj
= αsj(1−sj), the derivative
of bank j’s market share with respect to its deposit interest rate is reﬂected in the
magnitude of the estimated coeﬃcient of price, α̂ = 0.474 for the IV logit model.
The nested logit model enables us to test market segmentation between
grouped products. As explained in the previous section, σ in the nested logit model
represents within group correlation of consumer tastes. Thus, as σ gets larger, de-
positors are more likely to switch within grouped banks than to switch between
grouped banks. For instance, when the estimated σ equals 1, it means that if a
depositor changes her bank, she would switch only to another bank in the group
that the bank belongs to. In this case, markets across the grouped products are
interpreted to be fully segmented. I assumed two bank groups: “inside goods” (e.g.,
commercial banks) and “outside goods” (e.g., government-owned specialized banks).
σ̂ = 0.62 can be interpreted to mean that the market is very segmented between
commercial banks and government-owned specialized banks22.
The estimated derivatives of bank j’s market share with respect to its deposit
interest rate are derived from the estimated coeﬃcients of price in the logit model
and the nested logit model, respectively. For instance, let bank j have sj|g = 0.12
and sj = 0.05. Given α̂|Logit = 0.474 and α̂|Nested = 0.197 with σ̂ = 0.616, the
22From the equation 3,
∂sj
∂rdj
= α
(1−σ)sj [1 − σsj|g − (1 − σ)sj ], as σ is larger, the ratio of market
share to the group share, sj|g(= sj/sg), is much weighted for measuring the depositors’ demand
sensitivity.
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derivatives of bank j’s market share with respect to its deposit interest rate are
∂sj
∂rdj
|Logit = 0.0229 and ∂sj∂rdj |Nested = 0.0232. Note that although the estimated
coeﬃcient of price are smaller in the nested model, the estimated derivatives of
bank j’s market share are a little greater in the nested model.
Results in Table B.5 show the coeﬃcients of marginal costs estimated in
the equilibrium model combining demand and supply. Marginal costs due to the
deposit interest rate increase are assumed to be constant across banks. The estimate
of marginal cost are 0.897 in the logit model and 0.863 in the nested logit model.
The estimate of marginal cost of branching activities increases with the number of
branches, implying a convex cost function of the number of branches. As a bank’s
age increases, the marginal cost of branching activities decreases. It might be due
to a high ﬁxed cost investment and regulation on branching activities per year.
Regional banks’ branching activities only in the restrictive provinces may cost less
than it does for other banks branching extensively throughout the nation.
2.6.2 Network Analysis
Commercial banks in Korea can be divided into three categories, which diﬀer in
the branch network. The ﬁrst one – the big 6 nationwide commercial banks that
entered before 1960s – has an ‘extensive’ branch network23 with 300-400 branches
(lots of branches) throughout the nation. The second one – the medium-sized na-
tionwide commercial banks that entered the market after 1980s – has an ‘extensive’
branch network with around 100 branches (small number of branches) throughout
the nation. The third one – the regional banks restricted to their provinces – has
an ‘intensive’ branch network with around 100 branches in their regions.
23Banks may locate their branches in many markets but small number of branches in the market,
or they may locate their branches in small number of markets but many branches in the market. I
call the former branch network “extensive branch network” and the latter branch network “intensive
branch network”.
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Table B.6 and Table B.7 show summary statistics for branch networks for the
three categories of banks over the sample period (1994-1996). Figure B.1 also shows
the trend of branch networks and deposit interest rates for the three categories of
banks. Like branch networks, deposit interest rates also are relatively similar among
banks in the each category. In particular, note that although medium-sized banks
and regional banks, on average, have around 100 branches, those two categories of
banks are very diﬀerent in deposit interest rates. Based on these three categories
of banks, I analyze the eﬀects of branch network on markups, own / cross price
elasticity of demand, the branch elasticity of demand, and depositor’s preference
over branch density and deposit rate.
Estimated markups and price elasticity of demand
Table B.10 shows the estimated markups, which are average values within the three
categories of banks for each period. The estimated markup deﬁned as price minus
the estimated marginal costs can be obtained in the model assuming Bertrand-
Nash competition as follows; rlt− rdjt− m̂cjt =
∑
m Mtmsjtm
α̂
∑
m Mtmsjtm(1−sjtm) . Regional banks
have the highest markups, 2.80%-2.85%. Big 6 banks have markups of 2.3% and
medium-sized banks have markups of 2.2%. Banks’ estimated markups amount to
about 25%-40% of their deposit interest rates. Although big 6 banks have around 3
times more branches than regional banks, the estimated markups of regional banks
are much greater than those of big 6 banks. It is regarded that the intensive branch
networks, for instance those of regional banks, are used to increase markups more
eﬀectively.
Banks expanded their branches competitively, as evidenced by the more than
10% annual growth rate of bank branches from 1994 to 1996. However, this branch-
ing competition did not increase their markups as shown in Table B.10. Nationwide
46
banks had relatively constant markups over the period and regional banks had
slightly lower markups as well. Those banks’ branch expansion competition may
have two eﬀects on their competitiveness. The ﬁrst one increases depositors’ will-
ingness to pay by providing higher quality of service such as easy access to the bank
and thus raises bank’s competitiveness, which may increase deposit interest rates.
The second eﬀect increases depositors’ willingness to pay for rivals’ service due to ri-
vals’ branch expansion and thus reduces bank’s competitiveness, which may decrease
deposit interest rates. Based on the estimates, neither eﬀect of branch expansion
competition dominates.
Price elasticity of demand is the unit-free measure for depositors’ responsive-
ness to price. It here is deﬁned as
∂Qjt(r
d
jt)
∂rdjt
rdjt
Qjt(rdjt)
=
∑
m Mtm
∂sjtm
∂rdjt
× r
d
jt∑
m Mtmsjtm
,
based on the markets where the banks serve24. It can vary across ﬁrms in the same
industry. Medium-sized banks have the highest price elasticity of demand, 3.77-4.03,
while regional banks have the lowest elasticity of demand, 2.56-2.7225. It suggests
that demand for medium-sized banks with small number of branches in the markets
they serve are the most price sensitive and demand for regional banks with lots of
branches in the markets they serve are the least price sensitive26.
A measurement index for market power, the Lerner index, is deﬁned as the
inverse of price elasticity of demand. Using the Lerner index as the measurement of
market power, the result in Table B.12 shows that regional banks have the highest
Lerner index, 12.56(= 0.391). Big 6 banks and medium-sized banks have
1
3.26(= 0.307)
and 13.91(= 0.256), respectively. That is, Regional banks with locally intensive
24The reason that it is formulated this way is that banks compete on uniform pricing across the
markets it serves through its branch network.
25These estimated price elasticities of demand are consistent with the optimal pricing in the
oligopoly model which should have a price elasticity of demand that is greater than one.
26Intuitively, suppose that there are only branches that a bank owns in a market. Then, the
decrease in the bank’s deposit interest rate would rarely reduce its demand in the market, implying
a very low price elasticity.
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branch networks have the highest market power. It is notable that big 6 banks
have a higher Lerner index than the medium-sized banks. Therefore, It can be con-
cluded that a bank’s market power (Lerner index) is aﬀected critically by its own
branch network.
Table B.8 shows that the total market share of the big 6 banks and the
8 medium-sized banks was about 40% and 16%, respectively, while those of the 10
regional banks was only about 10%. According to Table B.9, on average, nationwide
banks have higher deposit amount per branch than regional banks. It is regarded
that the extensive branch networks, for instance those of nationwide banks, are
used to attract depositors more eﬀectively. This suggests that regional banks with
market intensive branch network earn their proﬁts by obtaining higher markups,
while nationwide banks with market extensive branch network earn their proﬁts by
obtaining higher demand per branch.
Estimated cross price elasticity of demand
The analysis on the cross price elasticity of demand also is based on the mul-
tiple markets where banks serve. Cross price elasticity of demand is deﬁned as
∂Qkt(r
d
jt)
∂rdjt
rdjt
Qkt(r
d
jt)
=
∑
m Mtm
∂sktm
∂rdjt
× r
d
jt∑
m Mtmsktm
. Table B.14 shows the average cross
price elasticity of demand based on three categories of banks. When a big 6 bank
increases its deposit interest rate by 1%, another big 6 bank experiences a decrease
in demand of, on average, 0.24%-0.26% and a medium-sized bank and regional bank
experience a decrease in demand of, respectively, 0.23%-0.25% and 0.16%-0.17%.
Regional banks experience less of decrease in demand than medium-sized banks and
other big 6 banks, because the branch networks of the regional banks do not overlap
much with those of other banks. It is noted that the cross price elasticity of demand
does not vary over time, which might be ascribed to their balanced branch network
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growth over time.
The model shows that for a 1% increase in the deposit interest rate of a
medium-sized bank, on average, a big 6 bank experiences a decrease in demand
of 0.091%-0.103%, whereas a medium-sized bank experiences a demand decrease
of 0.104%-0.113%, and a regional bank experiences a demand decrease of 0.039%-
0.061%. It is notable that average cross price elasticity of demand of a medium-sized
bank with another medium-sized bank is higher than with other categories of banks,
in particular big 6 banks, despite the big 6 banks’ most extensive branch network.
This results from the fact that the branch networks of the medium-sized banks are
likely to overlap with those of other medium-sized banks more than with those of the
big 6 banks, with implying that medium-sized banks have targeted similar markets.
The estimated cross price elasticity of demand for deposit interest rate change
in the regional banks is much smaller. Big 6 banks and medium-sized banks expe-
rience a decrease in demand of only 0.020%-0.024% and other regional banks expe-
rience a loss of 0.003%. These results indicate that cross price elasticity of demand
is determined mostly by the degree of overlap between bank branch networks.
Estimated bank branch elasticity and depositor’s indiﬀerence curve
Based on the estimates in the Logit model, Figure B.6 shows the average branch den-
sities across markets on the vertical axis and the estimated median branch elasticity
in the corresponding market on the horizontal axis. Figure B.6 shows a positive
relation between branch density and branch elasticity. The result indicates that
banks established their branches more in markets with higher branch elasticities
that are more demand-sensitive to branching activities, for instance in markets in
the metropolitan area.
Median branch densities across each category of banks (big 6 banks, medium-
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sized banks, and regional banks) in their markets served are presented in Figure B.7,
with their corresponding branch elasticities. As shown in Figure B.7, regional banks
have a higher branch density than other categories of banks, given the same branch
elasticity. The equation (2.19) representing the optimal branch decision of banks
can be transformed to br
∗
Q =
(rl−rd−mc)
g′(br) × εbr. Lower marginal costs of branching
activity (g′(br)), higher markups (rl − rd −mc) and higher branch elasticity (εbr)
induce higher branch density. In particular, it is regarded that regional banks’ higher
branch density is ascribed to lower cost27 and higher markup.
The estimated indiﬀerence curve in Figure B.8 represents depositors’ prefer-
ences over diﬀerent product characteristics, deposit interest rates and branch den-
sity. A concave preference over branch density may give an explanation for nation-
wide banks’ extensive branch network making their branches higher average deposit
amount. Also, given the concavity for branch density, banks’ location of their new
branches in markets with lower branch density may attract depositors more, for
instance in cities or suburban areas rather than in a metropolitan area. The es-
timates representing concave preference for branch density are consistent with the
higher growth rate of branch network in the regional cities than in metropolitan ar-
eas. According to Table B.3, the average number of branches in the cities increased
from 25.4 to 34 in regional cities and from 50 to 56.1 in metropolitan areas over the
sample period.
27The regional banks’ lower marginal costs of branch activity may result from the lower oppor-
tunity cost. Due to the restrictions on location of their branches, regional banks may establish
branches even in less proﬁtable markets than outside their provinces. Therefore, the restriction
lowers the opportunity cost of their branches.
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2.7 Conclusion
This paper has developed a structural model in the competitive framework to ex-
amine banks’ competition through their branch network and deposit interest rates.
In particular, it explicitly modelled the banks’ choice of deposit interest rates and
branch network as well as the depositors’ choice of banks. With focusing on com-
petition among three categories of banks – big 6 banks, medium-sized banks, and
regional banks, it examined the eﬀect of banks’ branch network and branch competi-
tion in the sample period (1994-1996). It also investigated the strategic relationship
between deposit interest rate and branch network through the estimated markups,
price / branch elasticity of demand and cross elasticity of demand.
The results indicate that all coeﬃcients of deposit services, such as branch
density, staﬃng, banks’ age, and service of foreign exchange, are positive. The esti-
mated price coeﬃcient in the logit model is 0.4740, with price elasticity of demand
2.5-4.0 across the three categories of banks. Based on the logit results, the esti-
mated markups for each category of banks vary from 2.2% (medium-sized banks)
and 2.3% (big 6 banks) to 2.8% (regional banks), on average. The estimated price
elasticity of demand is the smallest for regional banks, while it is the largest for
medium-sized banks. This suggests that the banks’ divergent branch networks have
a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the estimated markups and the estimated price elasticities. In
particular, regional banks with market intensive branch network earn their proﬁts
by obtaining higher markups, while nationwide banks with market extensive branch
network earn their proﬁts by obtaining higher demand per branch. The estimated
markups of the three categories of banks were stable over the period (1994-1996),
despite severe branching competition.
The estimated cross price elasticity of demand is the largest for big 6 banks
with the most extensive branch network, which would be the most likely to overlap
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other banks’ branches. It is the smallest for regional banks with the most intensive
branch network, which would be the least likely to overlap other banks’ branches.
It suggests that substitutability among banks (cross price elasticities of demand )
are related to the degree of overlap between their branch networks.
I found that the relationship between their branches and their branch elas-
ticities in the markets is positive. Regional banks’ higher branch density is ascribed
to lower cost of branches and higher markup. The estimated concave preference
over branch density is consistent with nationwide banks’ extensive branch network
and higher average deposit amounts of their branches.
This paper found that commercial banks expanding their branches in the
sample periods did not change their market power or markups. Seemingly, the
banks’ branch expansion succeeded in increasing their deposit amounts. However,
the branch competition between banks caused them to have almost the same market
shares as before the branch competition. As a result, bank branch competition did
not improve their proﬁtability in the deposit market. After currency crisis, the
government encouraged mergers between banks. 12 mergers between banks took
place only in a short period of a few years. It would be worth of examining the
eﬀect of those mergers on the banks’ market power.
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Appendix A
Appendix of Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose pibu − piec > Vb. Then, since w + Vθ − zθf − pibu <
w − zθf − piec for all (f, θ(= b or t)), any traveller choosing between airline i’s two
classes will purchase airline i’s economy class service. However, if airline i reduces
pibu to p̂
i
bu = p
i
ec + Vb, then any business travellers who would buy its economy class
will change to business class. Such a price change reduces the cost by Vb − cH for
each of airline i’s business travellers, while it does not cause airline i to lose demand
from business travellers. Hence, it contradicts.
Suppose pibu− piec < Vt. Then, since w+Vθ − zθfθ − pibu > w− zθfθ − piec, for
all (f, θ) , any traveller choosing between airline i’s two classes will purchase airline
i’s business class. However, if airline i reduces piec to p̂iec = p
i
bu−Vt, then any tourists
who would buy business class will change to economy class. Such a price change
should reduce costs by cH −Vt, without making airline i lose demand from tourists.
Hence, it contradicts.
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Proof of Lemma 2. By Lemma 1, each airline i’s proﬁt maximization problem is
max{pibu, piec} π
i =
N
1 + β
{β(zb + p
j
bu − pibu
2zb
)(pibu − c− cH) (A.1)
+ (
zt + p
j
ec − piec
2zt
)(piec − c)}
, where i = A,B and j = i.
From FOCs,
pibu(p
j
bu, p
j
ec)− piec(pjbu, pjec) =
1
2
(
pjbu − pjec + cH + zb − zt
)
(A.2)
and
pjbu(p
i
bu, p
i
ec)− pjec(pibu, piec) =
1
2
(
pibu − piec + cH + zb − zt
)
. (A.3)
Let pibu−piec = Vb− δ (Vb−Vt > δ > 0). Substituting it into (3) and then (3)
into (2) again, pjbu− pjec = 12(Vb−δ + cH + zb− zt) and pibu− piec = 12{12(Vb−δ + cH +
zb−zt)+cH +zb−zt} = 14Vb+34(cH + zb − zt)− 14δ > Vb−δ, since zb − zt > Vb−cH .
It contradicts. Thus, there is no equilibrium in which Vb > pibu − piec > Vt for some
i. Suppose pibu − piec = Vt. Then, by (3) and Lemma 1, pjbu − pjec = min{Vb, 12(Vt +
cH + zb − zt)}. Plugging it into (2), pibu − piec = 12{min{Vb, 12(Vt + cH + zb − zt)}+
cH + zb − zt} > 12{min{Vb, 12(Vt + Vb)} + Vb} = min{Vb, 14Vt + 34Vb} > Vt, since
zb − zt > Vb − cH . Thus, it contradicts. Suppose pibu − piec = Vb. Then, by (3) and
Lemma 1, pjbu− pjec = Vb. Plugging it into (2), pibu− piec = 12(Vb + cH + zb− zt) > Vb.
It contradicts. By Lemma 1, pibu − piec > Vb is dominated by pibu − piec = Vb. Hence,
as long as zb − zt > Vb − cH , pi∗bu = pi∗ec + Vb, i = A,B.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let zb − zt ≤ Vb−cH . Temporarily, assume that each airline
solves the maximization problem for each class service independently. Then, each
airline’s equilibrium prices are pibu = c+cH+zb and p
i
ec = c+zt, i = A,B. Note that
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the self-selection constraint does not bind, pibu − piec = cH + zb − zt ≤ Vb, i = A,B.
Hence, when zb − zt ≤ Vb − cH , pi∗bu = c + cH + zb and pi∗ec = zt, i = A,B.
Let zb − zt > Vb − cH . By Lemma 2, pi∗bu = pi∗ec + Vb, i = A,B. Substituting
it into (1), the airline i’s proﬁt maximization problem is
max{piec} π
i =
N
1 + β
{β(zb + p
j
ec − piec
2zb
)
(
piec + Vb − c− cH
)
(A.4)
+ (
zt + p
j
ec − piec
2zt
)
(
piec − c
)}.
Then, the equilibrium prices are obtained from (4).
Proof of Theorem 3. Let zb − zt ≤ Vb − cH . Temporarily, assume that airline
A’s self-selection constraint does not bind. Then, given that airline B provides only
economy class service, airline A’s proﬁt maximization problem is
max{pAbu, pAec} π
A =
N
1 + β
{β(zb + Vb + p
B
ec − pAbu
2zb
)(pAbu − c− cH) (A.5)
+ (
zt + pBec − pAec
2zt
)
(
pAec − c
)}.
From the FOCs,
pAbu(p
B
ec) =
1
2
(zb + Vb + pBec + c + cH) (A.6)
and
pAec(p
B
ec) =
1
2
(zt + pBec + c). (A.7)
Airline B’s proﬁt maximization problem is
max{pBbu, pBec} π
B =
N
1 + β
{β(zb − Vb + p
A
bu − pBec
2zb
)
(
pBec − cE
)
(A.8)
+ (
zt + pAec − pBec
2zt
)
(
pBec − cE
)}.
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From the FOC,
pBec(p
A
bu, p
A
ec) =
(β + 1)zbzt + βzt(pAbu − Vb) + zbpAec
2(βzt + zb)
+
cE
2
. (A.9)
From (A.6), (A.7) and (A.9), pAbu − pAec = 12(Vb + zb − zt + cH) ≤ Vb. That is,
it is consistent with the above assumption that airline A’s self-selection constraint
does not bind. Hence, from (A.6), (A.7) and (A.9), we have pA∗bu = c− c−cE3 + cH+Vb2 +
1
2(zb +
(1+β)zbzt
(zb+βzt)
) − β(Vb−cH)zt6(zb+βzt) , pA∗ec = c −
c−cE
3 +
1
2(zt +
(1+β)zbzt
(zb+βzt)
) − β(Vb−cH)zt6(zb+βzt) and
pB∗ec = cE− cE−c3 + (1+β)zbztzb+βzt −
β(Vb−cH)zt
3(zb+βzt)
.
Let zb − zt > Vb − cH . By Lemma 2, pA∗bu − pA∗ec = Vb. Plugging it into (A.5),
airline A’s proﬁt maximization problem becomes
max{pAec} π
A =
N
1 + β
{β(zb + p
B
ec − pAec
2zb
)
(
pAec + Vb − c− cH
)
(A.10)
+(
zt + pBec − pAec
2zt
)
(
pAec − c
)}.
From the FOCs,
pAec =
1
2
(
pBec + c
)
+
(1 + β)zbzt
2(zb + βzt)
+
β(cH − Vb)zt
2(zb + βzt)
(A.11)
and
pBec =
1
2
(
pAec + cE
)
+
(β + 1)zbzt
2(zb + βzt)
. (A.12)
Hence, from (A.9), (A.11) and (A.12), we have pA∗bu = c − c−cE3 + (1+β)zbztzb+βzt −
2β(V b−cH)zt
3(zb+βzt)
+ Vb, pA∗ec = c − c−cE3 + (1+β)zbztzb+βzt −
2β(Vb−cH)zt
3(zb+βzt)
and pB∗ec = cE− cE−c3 +
(1+β)zbzt
zb+βzt
− β(Vb−cH)zt3(zb+βzt) .
Proof of Theorem 5. Let zb − zt ≤ Vb − cH . D˜A∗bu (3)− D˜A∗ec (3) = − (1+β)(zb−zt)4(zb+βzt) +
(Vb−cH)
4(zb+βzt)
+ (zb+2β)zt(Vb−cH)12(zb+βzt)zb +
(zb−zt)(c−cE)
6zbzt
≥ (zbzt+2βzt)(zb−zt)12(zb+βzt)zb +
(zb−zt){2(c−cE)−3β}
12zbzt
>
0, since zb − zt ≤ Vb − cH and 2(c− cE)− 3β =14 . Also, note that
∂DA∗bu (3)
∂zt
=
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3(1+β)zb−β(Vb−cH)
12(zb+βzt)
2 > 0.
∂DA∗ec (3)
∂zt
|zt=zb < 0, ∂D
A∗
ec (3)
∂zt
|zt=z˜t = 0 and ∂
2DA∗ec (3)
(∂zt)2
< 0 where
z˜t =
√
3β(1+β)zb−β2(Vb−cH)
2(c−cE) − β, since
∂DA∗ec (3)
∂zt
=
2(c−cE)( zbzt +β)
2−3β(1+β)zb+β2(Vb−cH)
12(zb+βzt)
2 .
Let zb − zt > Vb − cH . Substituting c − cE = 0.5, β = 0.25, zb = 4
and zb − zt > Vb − cH , D˜A∗bu (3) − D˜A∗ec (3) = {(zb+βzt)(c−cE)−β(Vb−cH)zt}(zb−zt)6(zb+βzt)zbzt >
{(zb+βzt)(c−cE)−β(zb−zt)zt}(zb−zt)
6(zb+βzt)zbzt
= {(4+0.25zt)∗0.5−0.25(4−zt)zt}(zb−zt)6(zb+βzt)zbzt > 0,∀zt. Note that
∂DA∗ec (3)
∂zt
= (zb+βzt)
2(c−cE)−β2(Vb−cH)z2t
6(zb+βzt)
2z2t
> 0 and ∂D
A∗
bu (3)
∂zt
= β(Vb−cH)zb
3(zb+βzt)
2 > 0.
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A.2 Equilibrium proﬁts, prices, and demands in the sec-
ond stage
A.2.1 Case 1: both choose normal airplanes.
πi∗B/E (1) =
N
1 + β
[β
{
zb + p
j
bu(1)− pibu(1)
2zb
}(
pibu(1)−c− cH
)
+
{
zt + p
j
ec(1)− piec(1)
2zt
}(
piec(1)− c
)
],
where i = A,B and j = i.
No Binding Case: zb − zt < V b−cH
pi∗bu(1)=c + cH + zb, p
i∗
ec(1)=c + zt,
Di∗bu (1) =
βN
2(1 + β)
, Di∗ec (1) =
N
2(1 + β)
,
πi∗B/E (1) =
N
1 + β
{
βzb
2
+
zt
2
}
, i = A,B.
Binding Case: zb − zt > V b−cH
pi∗bu(1) = c + V b +
{(1 + β)zb − β(V b−cH)}zt
zb + βzt
,
pi∗ec(1) = c +
{(1 + β)zb − β(V b−cH)}zt
zb + βzt
,
Di∗bu (1) =
βN
2(1 + β)
, Di∗ec (1) =
N
2(1 + β)
,
πi∗B/E (1) =
N
1 + β
[
β{(1 + β)zt + (Vb − cH)}zb
2(zb + βzt)
+
{(1 + β)zb − β(Vb − cH)}zt
2(zb + βzt)
], i = A,B.
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A.2.2 Case 2: both choose low-cost carriers.
πi∗E (2) =
N
1 + β
[
β
{
zb + p
j
ec(2)− piec(2)
2zb
}(
piec(2)− cE
)
+
+
{
zt + p
j
ec(2)− piec(2)
2zt
}(
piec(2)− cE
)]
,
where i = A,B and j = i.
pi∗ec(2) = cE +
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
,
Di∗bu (2) =
βN
2(1 + β)
, Di∗ec (2) =
N
2(1 + β)
,
πi∗E (2) =
N
2
(
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
)
, i = A,B.
A.2.3 Case 3: one chooses a normal airplane and the other a low-
cost carrier.
πA∗B/E (3) =
N
1 + β
[β
{
zb + V b+pBec(3)− pAbu(3)
2zb
}(
pAbu(3)−c− cH
)
+
{
zt + pBec(3)− pAec(3)
2zt
}(
pAec(3)− c
)
],
πB∗E (3) =
N
1 + β
[β
{
zb − V b+pAbu(3)− pBec(3)
2zb
}(
pBec(3)−c− cH
)
+
{
zt + pAec(3)− pBec(3)
2zt
}(
pBec(3)− c
)
].
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No Binding Case: zb − zt < V b−cH
pA∗bu (3) =
2c + cE
3
+
cH+Vb
2
+
1
2
(zb +
(1 + β)zbzt
(zb + βzt)
)− β(Vb − cH)zt
6(zb + βzt)
,
pA∗ec (3) =
2c + cE
3
+
1
2
(zt +
(1 + β)zbzt
(zb + βzt)
)− β(Vb − cH)zt
6(zb + βzt)
,
pB∗ec (3) =
c + 2cE
3
+
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
− β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
.
DA∗bu (3) =
βN
2(1 + β)zb
{1
2
(
zb +
(1 + β)zbzt
(zb + βzt)
)
+
(3zb + 2βzt)(Vb − cH)
6(zb + βzt)
− c− cE
3
},
DA∗ec (3) =
N
2(1 + β)zt
{1
2
(
zt +
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
)
− β(Vb − cH)zt
6(zb + βzt)
− c− cE
3
}.
πA∗B/E (3) =
N
1 + β
[
β
2zb
{1
2
(
zb +
(1 + β)zbzt
(zb + βzt)
)
+
(3zb + 2βzt)(Vb − cH)
6(zb + βzt)
− c− cE
3
}
2
+
1
2zt
{1
2
(
zt +
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
)
− β(Vb − cH)zt
6(zb + βzt)
− c− cE
3
}
2
],
πB∗E (3) =
N
1 + β
[
β
2zb
{1
2
(
3zb − (1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
)
− (3zb + 2βzt)(Vb − cH)
6(zb + βzt)
+
c− cE
3
} ×
{
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
− β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
+
c− cE
3
}
+
1
2zt
{
1
2
(
3zt − (1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
)
+
β(Vb − cH)zt
6(zb + βzt)
+
c− cE
3
}
×
{
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
− β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
+
c− cE
3
}
].
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Binding Case: zb − zt > V b−cH
pA∗bu (3) =
2c + cE
3
+
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
− 2β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
+ Vb,
pA∗ec (3) =
2c + cE
3
+
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
− 2β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
pB∗ec (3) =
c + 2cE
3
+
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
− β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
.
DA∗bu (3) =
βN
2zb
{
zb +
β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
− c− cE
3
}
,
DA∗ec (3) =
N
2zt
{
zt +
β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
− c− cE
3
}
.
πA∗B/E (3) =
N
1 + β
[
β
2zb
{
zb +
β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
− c− cE
3
}
×
{
(1 + β)zbzt
(zb + βzt)
− 2β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
− c− cE
3
+ Vb − cH
}
+
1
2zt
{
zt +
β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
− c− cE
3
}
×
{
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
− 2β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
− c− cE
3
}
],
πB∗E (3) =
N
1 + β
[
β
2zb
{
zb − β(Vb − cH)zt3(zb + βzt) +
c− cE
3
}
×
{
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
− β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
+
c− cE
3
}
+
1
2zt
{
zt − β(Vb − cH)zt3(zb + βzt) +
c− cE
3
}
×
{
(1 + β)zbzt
zb + βzt
− β(Vb − cH)zt
3(zb + βzt)
+
c− cE
3
}
].
61
A.3 Figures
Figure A.1: Airline A and B’s proﬁts for SPE
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Figure A.2: Airline A’s business and economy prices for SPE
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Figure A.3: Airline B’s economy price for SPE
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Figure A.4: Demands for airline A’s business and economy classes for SPE
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Figure A.5: SPE and Comparison between airline A and B’s proﬁts for the SPE
with Case 3 when β = 0.35
66
Figure A.6: Equilibria with cost structures maximizing social welfare when β = 0.35
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Figure A.7: SPE and Comparison between airline A and B’s proﬁts for the SPE
with Case 3 when c− cE = 0.6
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Figure A.8: Equilibria with cost structures maximizing social welfare when c−cE =
0.6
69
Figure A.9: SPE and Comparison between airline A and B’s proﬁts for the SPE
with Case 3 when zt = 1
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Figure A.10: Equilibria with cost structures maximizing social welfare when zt = 1
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Appendix B
Appendix of Chapter 2
B.1 Tables
Table B.1: Bank characteristics
Bank characteristics 1994 1995 1996
Branch numbers/bank 144.5 159.8 177.1
No. of employees per branch/bank 17.5 16.5 14.5
Per. of branches serving foreign exchange/bank 53 52 66
Per. of 1 year old branches/bank 7.8 9.8 8.6
Per. of 2 year old branches/bank 12.8 11.1 11.3
Per. of 3 year old branches/bank 10.2 10.7 9.6
Table B.2: Market characteristics
Markets in metropolitan areas Regional cities
Population 408180 214324
Market area size 51.34 113.78
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Table B.3: Number of banks and branches in two types of markets
Metropolitan areas Regional cities
1994 1995 1996 1994 1995 1996
Number of branches 50.0 52.3 56.1 25.4 29.9 34.0
Number of banks 10.4 10.8 11.2 6.6 7.5 7.9
Table B.4: Demand estimation with GMM
IV Logit Nested Logit
Explanatory variables Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Deposit interest rate 0.474 (9.80) 0.197 (5.99)
Branch density 0.792 (6.40) 0.672 (9.85)
Branch density squared -0.203 (-5.01) -0.150 (-5.97)
Employees per branch 0.043 (0.97) 0.097 (4.17)
Per. of serving foreign exchange 0.095 (11.87) 0.058 (10.26)
log(bank’s age) 0.507 (16.83) 0.131 (4.12)
Per. of three-year old branches -0.271 (-3.94) -0.149 (-4.18)
Per. of two-year old branches -0.658 (-9.63) -0.320 (-7.79)
Per. of one-year old branches -1.294 (-12.94) -0.587 (-8.36)
Local bank dummy 1.082 (17.10) 0.243 (4.04)
Year dummy (94) -7.549 (-15.94) -2.779 (-6.65)
Year dummy (95) -7.729 (-15.85) -2.832 (-6.59)
Year dummy (96) -7.691 (-16.25) -2.794 (-6.58)
ln(sj|g) - - 0.616 (15.70)
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Table B.5: Supply estimation with GMM
IV Logit Nested Logit
Explanatory variables Coeﬃcient t-value Coeﬃcient t-value
Constant (deposit rate) 0.837 (3.04) 0.863 (1.61)
Number of branches (branch) 0.119 (3.69) 0.325 (3.87)
log(bank’s age) (branch) -0.094 (-2.91) -0.188 (-2.45)
Regional bank dummy (branch) -1.366 (-4.07) -3.073 (-3.60)
Year dummy (94) (branch) 0.497 (3.32) 0.863 (2.56)
Year dummy (95) (branch) 0.520 (3.43) 0.909 (2.65)
Year dummy (96) (branch) 0.578 (3.60) 1.029 (2.77)
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Table B.6: Average number of branches for three categories of banks
1994 1995 1996
6 Big banks 327 360 411
Medium banks 90 105 116
Regional banks 100 108 121
Table B.7: Average branch density in two types of markets
Metropolitan areas Regional cities
1994 1995 1996 1994 1995 1996
6 Big banks 0.218 0.224 0.234 0.024 0.027 0.031
Medium banks 0.106 0.108 0.110 0.015 0.016 0.016
Regional banks 0.309 0.317 0.328 0.066 0.073 0.079
Table B.8: Sum of market shares for three categories of banks
1994 1995 1996
6 Big banks 40.28% 39.00% 38.40%
Medium banks 16.46% 18.01% 19.31%
Regional banks 10.32% 10.77% 10.65%
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Table B.9: Deposit amount per branch for three categories of banks
1994 1995 1996
6 Big banks 422.47 458.19 498.27
Medium banks 470.08 546.37 666.43
Regional banks 211.95 253.01 280.65
Table B.10: Average estimated markups for three cat-
egories of banks (Logit model)
bank 1994 1995 1996
Big 6 banks 2.303 2.299 2.297
Medium banks 2.196 2.200 2.203
Regional banks 2.849 2.831 2.804
Table B.11: Average estimated markups for three cat-
egories of banks (Nested Logit model)
bank 1994 1995 1996
Big 6 banks 2.316 2.308 2.303
Medium banks 2.169 2.174 2.177
Regional banks 3.210 3.143 3.085
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Table B.12: Average estimated price elasticities for
three categories of banks (Logit model)
bank 1994 1995 1996
Big 6 banks 3.258 3.373 3.250
Medium banks 3.911 4.033 3.772
Regional banks 2.557 2.719 2.708
Table B.13: Average estimated price elasticities for
three categories of banks (Nested Logit model)
bank 1994 1995 1996
Big 6 banks 3.241 3.360 3.241
Medium banks 3.960 4.082 3.817
Regional banks 2.280 2.458 2.467
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Table B.14: Average estimated cross price elasticities for three
categories of banks (Logit model)
Price change Demand change 1994 1995 1996
Big 6 banks Big 6 banks -0.257 -0.258 -0.246
Medium banks -0.248 -0.246 -0.232
Regional banks -0.170 -0.173 -0.161
Price change Demand change 1994 1995 1996
Medium banks Big 6 banks -0.091 -0.102 -0.103
Medium banks -0.104 -0.113 -0.111
Regional banks -0.039 -0.053 -0.061
Price change Demand change 1994 1995 1996
Regional banks Big 6 banks -0.020 -0.022 -0.021
Medium banks -0.020 -0.023 -0.024
Regional banks -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
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Table B.15: Average estimated cross price elasticities for three
categories of banks (Nested Logit model)
Price change Demand change 1994 1995 1996
Big 6 banks Big 6 banks -0.341 -0.341 -0.322
Medium banks -0.326 -0.322 -0.303
Regional banks -0.242 -0.244 -0.225
Price change Demand change 1994 1995 1996
Medium banks Big 6 banks -0.119 -0.133 -0.134
Medium banks -0.136 -0.148 -0.146
Regional banks -0.054 -0.072 -0.082
Price change Demand change 1994 1995 1996
Regional banks Big 6 banks -0.028 -0.030 -0.029
Medium banks -0.026 -0.030 -0.032
Regional banks -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
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B.2 Figures
Figure B.1: Branch networks and deposit rates across three categories of banks
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Figure B.2: Deposit interest rates and price elasticities (Logit model)
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Figure B.3: Deposit interest rates and price elasticities (Nested Logit model)
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Figure B.4: Deposit interest rates and Lerner index (Logit model)
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Figure B.5: Deposit interest rates and Lerner index (Nested Logit model)
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Figure B.6: branch elasticities based across markets (Logit model)
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Figure B.7: branch branch elasticities across banks (Logit model)
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Figure B.8: Indiﬀerence Curve
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